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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to investigate the

relationship between the facilitation with language and
imagery as a function of deafness and age.

It is argued

that imagery and language are two independent, although

interacting aspects of thought (Bovier 1970, Paivio I969,
Furth I966, Piaget I962)

,

and that imagery is a potent

factor in learning and memory (Bower 1970, Paivio I969).
Subject populations may differ in absolute terms, i.e. one

population may be more or less proficient with language or
imagery or both when compared with another population.

And populations may differ in their relative facilitation
with one code as compared, to another code.

It is hypothe-

sized that the variables of deafness and age do affect the

absolute as well as the relative proficiencies with imagery
and language.

The Independence of Thought and Language
The problem of the relationship between thought

and language must be at least as old as the printed word.

Aristotle found language necessary for knowledge (Mesthene
196^)

,

and we are familiar with the often quoted and equally

often contested proclamation: "In the beginning was the
.
. .

"

(John, p. 92).

Among the more recent theorists who

V/ord

subscribe to such a view of the all- import ant role of

language are John Watson, who reduces thought to implicit

verbal responses (Watson 1913, 1930), and Benjamin Whorf,
with his thesis that a person's language determines his

world view (Whorf I956).
Nature has provided us with a target population,
the deaf, which promises some clarification of the problem;
in Eans Furth* s words •

"...the study of deaf persons may

contribute in a unique way to our general knowledge of
thinking and its relation to language" (Furth 1966, p. 69).
Consequently, a host of investigators has studied the deaf,
in order to answer the questions is there such a thing as

thinking without language?

After an extensive review of

the literature and after an equally ambitious research

program, Furth answers the question in the following way:
We know that it [thinking without

language

is possible with a degree

of certitude that we would not dare

assert if empirical observation of
o

«

deaf persons had not provided a

natural

e xperi mentum

crucis.

(p.l69)c

Furth (I966) found no differences between the deaf and the

hearing on most experimentally used intellective tasks.

Tl

deaf were as competent as the hearing in the comprehension
and use of abstract principles and symbols.

On some tasks

such as Piaget type tasks and logical symbol discovery,

•

younger deaf groups seemed somewhat retarded.

Such tasks

share the aspect of discovery, and Furth argued that the

poorer social environment and training of the deaf do not
foster curiosity.

Inferior performance on these tasks was

explained by the general experiential handicap of the deaf
rather than being due to their linguistic incompetency.
Furth (I966) supported this hypothesis with the finding,
that a rural control group, which was presumably culturally

deprived without, however, evidencing language deficiency,

performed as poorly as the deaf on a discovery task, but
performed as well as the deaf on tasks of symbol use and
symbol comprehension.

Thus, Furth argued that, in spite of

their retardation in language, the deaf are not inferior

intellectually to the hearing, and that those inferiorities

which the deaf do demonstrate in certain areas, are not due
to their language deficiency,

but are attributable to

experiential and environmental factors.

He concludes:

The evidence for conceptual

thinking in the linguistically

deficient deaf ... leads to the
direct conclusion that thinking-

develops through living contact

with the environment regardless
of the presence or absence of a

ready-made linguistic symbol
system,

(pp. 198-199

)

Rosenstein (1959) claimed that deaf children are
equal to hearing children on non-verbal tasks as well as on

verbal task-, provided that the verbal understanding required
by the experimental task is within the capacity of the deaf

child.

This claim regarding the performance on verbal tasks

is not substantiated in various other investigations (Oleron

1950, 1957

»

Templin 1950).

These studies nevertheless support

my thesis that thinking can and does occur independently of
language.

Kates, Kates and Michael (I962) documented in a

series of studies that deaf adolescents do not differ from

hearing subjects on adequacy of categorization, range of

acceptance for membership in a category, generizability of
categories and extent of uninstructed change of categorizations

—

a measure of rigidity.

The deaf differed only when

verbal aspects were involved, such as adequate categorizations

accompanied by inadequate verbalizations or the categorization
of words.

On such verbal measures the deaf adolescents

consistently resembled those younger hearing subjects which
were matched on language achievement, thusly indicating that
the deaf's linguistic retardation falls along normal develop-

mental lines.

No differences were found between deaf and

hearing adults on any of the employed verbal and nonverbal
measures.

Similar support comes from Kates (1969)8
Deaf Ss were as able as hearing Ss

matched on age, IQ, and socioeconomic
background in learning and using

logical concepts, and superior to

hearing Ss matched on written

language comprehension, IQ, and
socioeconomic background in learning these concepts.

Verbal language

comprehension apparently does not

possess an exclusive determining
influence in learning and grasping
the significance of these concepts.
In consonance with these findings, Anthony Moore's

(1968) deaf adolescents were inferior to age-matched hearing

subjects on tasks which involved linguistic aspects.

On the

other hand, when the cues on a conceptual discovery task were

primarily of a visual nature, the same deaf pupils made
significantly fewer errors than the hearing.

Many of these investigators of the deaf offer direct
and strong statements in support of my thesis that there is
thought without and independent of language (Furth I964, I966,

Kates et ali 1962(a), Kates I969, Blanton 1968).
Possibly the most striking naturalistic documentation of thought occurring without language is provided by

animals and pre-verbal children.

The child solves problems

and interacts in a meaningful and adaptive manner with the
environment, without recourse to a linguistic symbolic code.
I

do not hesitate to apply the label of 'thought*

to those

nonverbal cognitive processes which must necessarily occur

within the child.

The process of memory may be the most

crucial of these cognitive processes and it may be, that

meaningful experience is impossible without this memory
process.

Without memory, every stimulus would be novel and

foreign and would not lend itself to prediction and inference
or future use.

William James (1950, Vol.1, PpJl<59ff) speaks

of our

same ness which is "the very keel and backbone

fiense, o f

of our thinking'

Piaget's *object constancy

1

.

1

is achieved by

•deferred imitation* which "...is an observable symbolic

activity which, as it were, enlarges the scope of the known
object by extending its identity or permanence in time and
space.

limit ation

is thus t he first true s ymbol " (Furth I966,

p.l?9» my underlining)

«>

It should be obvious that this

imitative symbolic coding of the external object cannot be a

linguistic coding.

The term 'imitation* itself indicates

that the symbol consists of those neural activities which

occur in the act of perception.

The ability to keep these

neural excitations active, to store them as a code, and to

reactivate them during a subsequent encounter with the given
object in order to obtain a match, results in recognition.

Recognition allows the perception of a stable world, and it
is only after objects have achieved this constancy, that a

verbal label

cr,n

be associated with them.

For Piaget (i960, p. 32), action and sonsori-motor

experience are the source and medium of intelligence, and
Inhclder et al. (I966) theorize that even operational thought

may be a new coordination of perception and action, rather
than being based on linguistic development*

Quite in accord-

ance with Plaget's notion that the levels of cognitive devel-

opment have to preceed the use of certain linguistic operations, Furth (1966, p. 200) and Kates et all

(1962a) express

that language in itself is one of the main subjects of the

learning process of the child, and that "... it seems hard
to assume that language is one of the main determinants of a

learning process where it itself is the central material
being learned" (Kates et al. 1962a, p<>30).
While we find abundant evidence documenting that

thought does occur without language, the independence of
these two processes is also demonstrated by the fact that

language does not necessarily affect thinking.

Herriot (1970)

observes that "iiiovert language is pretty well developed
syntactically by the age at which children still think in
chain complexes" and that "grammatical skill

plete by the age of five
••e

i.'ii

is

almost com-

while formal operational thought

is not normally attained until puberty, and operational

thought in general until seven or eight" (Herriot 1970, p.131)

Inhelder and Piaget (196^, p. 293) conclude that the use and

comprehension of linguistic terms, such as "all" and "some"
depend on the child*

s

level of development of operational

behavior, and this behavior has its own 'laws, of equilibration

independent of language.

Ervin- Tripp and Slobin (I966) report

that "... a study of conservation of quantities

by Sinclair

8

and Inhelder, 1963^ showed that training children to give
the verbal formulation characteristic of the more advanced

stages produced no changes in cognitive performance".
A different consideration supporting the point at

issue here, stems from the observation that";., one sentence

may express different thoughts, one thought may be expressed
in different sentences" (Vygotsky 1962, p. 149).

This obser-

vation points to the independence of thought and language,
as well as to the supremacy or priority of thought over

language, and Vygotsky (I962, p.150) pronounces that

".<,.

in our speech, there is always the hidden thought, the sub-

text".
In conclusion of this section we note that the poets

have separated thought from language
of the latter

—

—

usually at the expense

independent of psychological experimentation.

For Bergson, thought was 'pure* and was distorted by words,

Tjutchev proclaimed that "a thought once uttered is a lie"
(from Vygotsky I962), and Chinese fortune cookies tell us

that "one picture is worth a thousand words".

For Norman 0.

Brown (I966, p. 257) "the fall is into language"; Kahlil

Gibran preaches to the scholar:

"You talk when you cease to

be at peace with your thoughts" (I969, p.60)„

Aldous Huxley

(1954) advises us to "intensify our ability to look at the

world directly and not through the half opaque medium of
concepts, which distorts every given fact into the all too

familiar likeness of some generic label or explanatory

"

abstraction", and Goethe, correcting the biblical quote above,

writes assured;

"In the beginning was the Deed".

A whole world view, namely Zen Buddhism, begins and

ends with this negation of language.

It is language which

dichotomizes, separates, distorts and creates insoluble paradoxes.

Satori, or enlightenment "... is knowledge of the most

adequate kind, only it cannot be expressed in words" (Suzuki
1956, p. 104).

"The highest truth is unf attainably deep, is

not an object of talk or discussion, and even the canonical
texts have no way to bring it within our reach.

Let us once

see into cur own original Nature and we have the truth, even

when

vie

are quite illiterate, not knoviing

(Suzuki 1956, p. 88).

a

word

• .

.

Upon enlightenment, Zon monks burn their

books and the master Mum on comments (Reps, p. 114):
When the mouth opens

All are wrong.

The Usefulness of Language.
In spite of the previous considerations,

it cannot

be denied that language is of extreme usefulness to the life

and thought of man.

The most obvious advantage inherent in

language is the communication that it allows.

Experience

and direct symbolic representation as it occurs in imagery
are of necessity private and specific, and only a public and

general coding system, such as language (gestural comnunica-

10

tion could also be classified as language), permits different

organisms to refer to

•

common

1

experiences.

It is in this

sense that v ygotsky writes: "... a thought unembodied in

words remains a shadow" and "a word is a microcosm of human

consciousness" (I962, p. 153), meaning that we share our

heritage and collective awareness only by way of communication.

The communicative aspect of language may have an

effect on thought through the process of cognitive socialization (Kates et al. 1962a).

Communication allows the concen-

sual validation of cognitive processes, thereby speeding up
the individual's development, as well as bringing his exper-

iences and intellective activities more in agreement with that
of other members of his culture.

edged sword.

V/hile

This aspect may be a two-

culture and society undoubtedly enrich

the individual's experience, stereotyping and de-individuali-

zation are the by-products (Huxley 195^> Schactel 19^7, Bower
1970).
An important aspect of language is its cueing or

directing function.

I

have already indicated my disagreement

with the deterministic Uhorfian view.

English speakers are

able to distinguish the same three kinds of snow that the
Eskimo distinguishes, even though the former use the same

word in all three instances (3rown "and Lenneberg 195^)

•

Language does not determine perceptual experience, but rather
vice versa.

The Eskimo's experience is such, that different

11

snow qualities may play an important role
in his life; thus,
he came to use three different labels.
On the other hand,
since English speakers do have only one word for
any kind of
snow, they are less liable to pay attention to
different snow
qualities, even though they can distinguish between
them.

In

other words, the informational input may be the same for
both,
but the English speaker is less liable to use this
specific

information (Henle 1958).

Thus, language does have some

&ireotional Power over thought.

In Luria's (1959) words:

"A word gives rise to new temporary connections in the brain

and directs the system of activity of the child that has

mastered it".

It is this aspect of language which prompts

Mesthene (1964) to proclaim that "language makes us know".
In Mesthene* s framework, language functions as 'agent in the

process of inquiry

1

,

it allows us to formulate a hypothesis

about an unexperienced event, which we can then verify in

actual experience, thereby leading to a 'new instance' and

increasing our knowledge of reality.

formulated propositionally.

"Past operations are

The internal structure of the

discourse that these propositions constitute permits derivation of further propositions which are not descriptive of

occurrences already observed" (p. 107).

An illustrative

example may be the strictly linguistic concepts of negativity

and passivity.

»

12

Language is general and public as compared to a

non-verbal cognitive code such as imagery, which is specific
and private.

The word is a superordfnate; it refers to a

class of experiences which are specific for each individual.
This generality of language allows the use of deduction in

respect to generalizing and reasoning, whereas an imagery
code permits only inductive reasoning, the comparison of

specific instances with other specific instances.

Deduction

is a much more powerful method than induction; it is easier,

faster, and leads to greater certainty.

This superiority of

deductive reasoning facilitated by language is repeatedly

demonstrated in transfer tasks (Pyles 19 32, Kuenne 19^6,

Kates I969

)•

The transfer of learning to a novel situation

is facilitated by language.
So far,

I

have argued that language is not

necessary for thought, but that it is useful (Herriot 1970,
Furth I.966, Lenneberg 196^).

It may be better to regard

language not as external and opposed to thought, but as one
of the cognitive coding systems which constitute thought.
Thought consists of certain neural activities (Kebb 19^9
I966), the reception, transmission and storage of informa-

tional codes.

Language is one of these codes and, as we

have seen, a useful but not an essential one.

13

Cognitive Coding Systems.
"Practical experience is a precondition of intell-

ectual activity" says Mesthene (1964), thereby expressing

what John Dewey (1929, 1938) and Albert Camus (1965) have

conveyed in their own ways.

Without experience we would not

have knowledge, yet, it is only through the latter that the

former gains meaning.

In order to interact with the environ-

ment in a meaningful way, an organism needs a representational
or symbolic coding system, the identification of external

objects by symbols (Lawrence 1953, P0I89).
Imagery*

The most immediate and basic of these

codes is the one that occurs upon perception of the outside
world, the direct neural representation of the percept.

code applies to all sensory modalities, and
it the 'sensory coding system 1

proposed to call

'imagery' is the term employed

;

extensively in the literature.

inevitably uses this code, and

1

This

Every perceiving organism
I

propose that it is this code

which is the basis of all thought and which makes sophisticated
cognitive activities possible even in the absence of language.
It is probable that some of the same neural activities which

are elicited during the perception of an object are also

involved in the processes of storage and retrieval (Bower 1970,

Neisser I967).

In summary, I refer to this code as the primary

cognitive code, because

14
a.

it is the immediate and direct representa-

tion of external reality, forming a link

between internal events and external
stimuli or referents,
b.

it is used in the absence of any other

codes, whereas the reverse is impossible,
i.e., imagery is necessary and sufficient

for cognitive processes, and
c.

it is used before any other code in terms

of development of an organism as well as
on the phylogenic scale.

With higher ranking on the phylogenic scale and

with greater maturity, organisms increasinly use sophisticated

abstractions of the basic sensory representation.

Abstracted

codes are less stimulus dependent, and through easy manipulation of their symbols they allow a great variety of combina-

tions (Herriot 1970, Bruner 1964).

We have already seen the

advantages inherent in the generality and publicity of such
abstractions.
Pi-Qtor_ial^^de.

This code consists of pictures,

which are a somewhat general and certainly a public representation of specific individual experiences.

This code may be

largely an external phenomenon, used for expression and
communication, rather than being an extensively used internal

neural representative system, and research of this question

may be indicated.

On the concreteness-abstractness dimension,

15

pictures fall between the sensory code and
language.
The
mental image of a dog portrays a specific
dog with specific
characteristics, the picture of a dog may contain

only those

few essential features which differentiate a
dog from other
animals; nevertheless, the picture indicates a
certain sized
dog, with certain proportions, certain length
and position of

tail and ears, long hair or no hair, engaged in a
certain
activity,,

A variety of actual instances may be represented

by such a picture.

The word 'dog

1

,

on the other hand, places

no restrictions on the referent, except its differentiation

from other animals.

In turn, the word •animal'

is at a level

of abstraction that the pictorial code is unable to represent.

Memory for pictures has been shown to fall somewhere between
the memory for objects and the memory for words (Paivio 19
69,

Bower 1970).

Auditory linguistic oode>

As already indicated,

language is a very powerful abstracted code.

I

postulate

that language is not a direct coding of actual experience,

but that the word is referring to the neural perceptual

representation of that experience, i.e., the word's referent
is the corresponding imagery (Laffal 19 65, p. 3, Brown R.W.

I958).

A label can only be applied or elicited after the

pre-attentive neural processes have been identified, and this
identification occurs in the synthesis of a perceptual image
(Neisser I967).

Language is basically carried in an auditory

fashion (Blanton 1968, Neisser 19 67, pp. 3^,103, Norman I969,

16

pp. 128, I36).

The evolutionary history of man, the learning

history of a single individual, the impressive evidence of
the phenomenon of auditory confusions (Conrad 196^, Conrad

and Hull 1964, Wickelgren I965, 19 66, I969), as well as the
superior performance with auditory linguistic stimuli as

compared to visual linguistic stimuli (Murdock I966, I967,
I968, I969) support such a view.
3Qj?J^JLJL ing.ili.gt i 0 code .
i

This code consists of a

visual symbolization of the auditory linguistic code.

In

its external, public form, this code facilitates more

extensive communication, otherwise it may have little life
of its own.

To use this code, it has to be decoded into the

auditory linguistic code upon reception and encoded from
that code for purposes of production (Neisser I967, p. 226,

Norman 1969

S

PP»128, 136,137)

.

A series of experiments by

Murdock (I966, I967, 1968, I969) gives credence to this view.
Murdock (I969) summarizes that the auditory modality has
been shown to be superior to the visual modality with paired

associate lists as well as with serial lists, with mixed as
well as with pure lists, and when tested for recall as well
as for recognition.

Gestural code.

gestural code.

Finally, there may also be a

As with the pictorial code and the visual

linguistic code, this symbolic system may function primarily
in an external, communicative manner, rather than being an

important medium of 'thought'.

I

suspect, that gestures

17

are a further abstraction of language, in the
sense that a

certain two-handed sweeping gesture stands for the
verbal

concept 'big*.

However, gestures could also be conceived

of as a more direct abstraction from the imagery code, and
in parallel to the auditory linguistic code.

In the case

of the deaf, the gestural code may gain even more importance
as possible language mediator (Odom et al. 1970).

Further

research may be indicated, in order to determine the status
of the gestural code, as well as to draw a more complete and

more accurate picture of man's cognitive coding systems in
general.

The Function of Imagery in Memory and Learning
In a previous research outline I proposed to show

the superiority of the imagery code over the linguistic

codes, as tested in a STM recognition task, using colors as

imagery stimuli and color words as linguistic stimuli.
Such positive findings seem to be well documented (Paivio
et al. 1968, Paivio I969, Bower 1970

).

Objects and pictures

are memorized better than their labels or words in general

(Kirkpatrick 1894, Ducharme and Fraisse 1965* Lieberman and

Culpepper I965, Jenkins et al. I96?)

•

This superiority

must be due to non-verbal aspects, since words can be read
faster than objects can be named (Fraisse 1964, Jensen and

Rohwer I966).

Bower (1970) concludes that the usual finding

that concrete sentences are remembered better than abstract

18

sentences, even when their verbal components are equated
and controlled for (sound, syllables, number and type of

letters), must be due to non-verbal imagery*

Paivio (I969)

reports extensive and consistent findings that imagery is
an effective and preferred (Paivio and Yuille I969) media-

tor in paired-associate tasks where at least the cue is of
a concrete nature.

Imagery instructions have yielded con-

sistent improvements of memory and learning on a variety of
tasks (Hulicka and Grossman I967, Paivio 1968, Bower, in
press).

The ancient strategy of using imagery as a

mnemonic device, rests on the implicit assumption that

memory for concrete objects is superior to memory for
words, and the reader can test this notion himself, by

following the

1

one-is-a-bun* technique as described in a

dramatic account by Miller, Galanter and Pribram (i960,
pp.l25ff).
In summary,

it seems to be clearly documented

that man's coding facilitation of external objects and

events decreases in the following order:

pictures of objects,

4.

names of concepts (abstract words)

1970).

actual objects,

names of objects (concrete words),

2.

3.

1,

(Paivio I969

»

Bower

This coding facilitation is a function of imagery,

i.e., memory and learning (= cognitive processes) are enhan-

ced with an increase in subjects' "imagery ability (Kuhlman
i960, Steward I965, both in Paivio I969) and their use of

imagery, and with an increase of the imagery evoking value
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of the stimulus.

Paivio at al. (1 9 68) and Paivio et
al.

(1966) showed that it may not bo the
meaning-fulness of a
stimulus, a measure called »m', which
determines learning,
but rather the imagery evoking value
of the stimulus, a

measure called

'I*

.

Of course, these two measures have a

high correlation, as we would expect, namely
.72 (Paivio
1969).

When these two measures were varied
independently,

i.e., varying one measure while holding the
other one constant, •I emerged as the factor most responsible
for
1

learning.

Various theories and assumptions are being offered
in view of these findings.

The two-process theory of assoc-

iative meaning and mediation (Paivio I969) states that imagery is predominantly used with concrete stimuli, while

verbal mediation is preferred for abstract items.

An illum-

inating finding in this respect comes from Atwood (I969, in

Bower 1970):

visual interference was .greatest when subjects

were visualizing concrete items, whereas auditory interference was greatest when subjects were visualizing abstract
items.

This theory does not exclude the possibility of

imagery mediation of abstract stimuli, and McDonald (I967,
reported in Paivio I969) showed that such imagery may be
used effecti/ely.
to

With many more years of research

I

hope

substantiate my suspicion that even abstract thinking as

it occurs with the use of abstract language may be anchored
in the concrete imagery of its referents.

The dual coding assumption (Bower
1970) implies

that concrete stimuli, e.g., objects and
pictures, can be

coded in imagery as well as in a verbal code,
whereas more
abstract items, from concrete to abstract words,
are

increasingly restricted to only one code, namely the linguistic code.

Somewhat of a cross-product of the two-

process theory and the dual coding assumption is the availability assumption (Paivio 1969)1
Image arousal in the case of pictures

and verbal coding in the case of words
have the highest availability, the verbal code to pictures second, imagery
to concrete words third, and images to

abstract words fourth.

Thus, the

summative availability of

both,

codes

is highest in the case of pictures,

intermediate for concrete nouns, and
lowest for abstract nouns (p. 257).
These explanations are consistent with the inter-

pretation that the superior coding of concrete stimuli as
compared to abstract stimuli is

'

...

a function of the dif-

ferential availability of concrete imagery as a supplementary coding system

.

(Paivio 19$9> P»257)»

While such

availability of imagery may be a function of individual

differences (Kuhlman i960, Stewart 1965? both in Paivio 1969)5
I

contend that the use of imagery when comparing populations,
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as well as the relative facility with imagery compared to

language within populations, may be a function of population
parameters.

This approach may be especially fruitful in

view of the reported "failure of individual differences to
be predictive of memory in the research on imagery in the

early part of the century ..." (Paivio I969).

The Problem.
Two such population parameters which are hypothe-

sized to affect the absolute as well as the relative facil-

itation with imagery and with language are deafness and age.
1^

"j-

s

possible that the deaf have more

facilitation with imagery than the hearing.

Blanton (I968)

notes that the deaf have "excellent visual memories" and he
even points to similarities with eidetic imagery.

In inves-

tigating word-association patterns, Blanton (I968) found
that the deaf use more word-to-object associations than the

age matched hearing subjects, while word-to-word associations

were more prevalent in the latter group.

This may indicate

that the deaf tend to concretize their language, thereby

increasing their use of the imagery coding system.

The data

of Kates e" al. (1962a) lend support to this interpretation

Their deaf adolescents used more concrete verbalizations
than the age-matched as well as the language-matched hearing

subjects.

Concrete words are more liable to evoke imagery

22

(Paivio I969), and the deaf»s greater use of such words
may

reflect their greater use and facilitation of imagery.

On

a conceptual discovery task involving predominantly the use

of visual cues? Moore's (1968) deaf subjects made signifi-

cantly fewer errors than the age and IQ matched hearing
pupils,

Blanton (I968), in speculating on the relationship

between verbal and non-verbal comprehension systems, states:
"Perceptual units would probably be more frequently employed

where the encoding of perceptions into words is difficult".
I

assume that such difficulties exist for the deaf, who are

handicapped in their language acquisition and language development.

As a consequence, the weight of their thought pro-

cesses should be carried by the imagery code.

Facilitation with a cognitive code, as reflected in

performance scores, and the inferred reliance and dependence
on such a code, are closely interrelated concepts.

One could

argue that greater proficiency of a code is achieved through

increasing use (reliance, dependence) of that code, while the

antithesis could also be defended, namely that the greater
use of and dependence on a given mode of thought is the

Both these processes

result of the proficiency of this mode.
are undoubtedly at work*

However,

I

do not believe that the

deaf perform better with imagery, as hypothesized, merely

because they' are by nature more proficient with this code
and consequently make more use of it.

I

would rather explain
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this superiority

—

if found

—

as a result of the deaf's

necessarily greater dependence and reliance on imagery as
a cognitive code.

This greater dependence of the deaf on imagery as
a cognitive code should not only differentiate the deaf's

absolute proficiency with imagery as compared to the hearing.
We may also compare the relative proficiency with imagery as

compared to language for the deaf and the hearing.
words, since

I

In other

postulate that the deaf are more dependent on

their imagery coding than the hearing are on their respective imagery code, I hypothesize greater differences to exist

between the relative usage and proficiency of the deaf's

imagery and linguistic codes, than to exist between these
codes for the hearing.

Consistent with this view is the

finding of a dissociation between words and their referents
for the deaf (Kates et al. 1962a).

We remember that the

deaf adolescents were equal to the age-matched hearing peers
in adequacy of categorization of objects.

When categorizing

words, however, the deaf did significantly poorer than the

age-matched hearing.

Performance of the deaf deteriorated

when going from categorization of objects to categorization
of words, whereas the age-matched hearing subjects performed

either better or equally well with the words than with their
referents.

The same trend of dissociation shows in measur-

ing the width of categories, the deaf using more categories

for words than for objects, while the hearing peers evidenced

2k

the opposite.

Kates et al. (1962a) postulate this dissoci-

ation to fall along normal developmental lines, since the
deaf's performance resembled that of the younger language-

matched hearing.

Further testimony for this dissociation

of words and objects in the case of the deaf, is the finding that the deaf had significantly more adequate categori-

zations accompanied by inadequate verbalizations than the

age-matched hearing.
Age.

Age is thought to be another variable which

affects cognitive processes.

It is possible that younger

persons think more in imagery than older persons, such
differences being especially potent in the earlier develop-

mental stages and decreasing with the advent of adulthood.
This heavier reliance on perceptual coding may de due to the

relative language deficiency as well as to the lesser degree
of cultural indoctrination.

Bower (I970) speculates that

the child may rely greatly on imagery , but may learn to pre-

fer linguistic coding, which has the side-effect of leading
to conceptual stereotyping.

This notion was expressed earl-

ier by Schachtel (19^7) who noted that the freshness and
"real significance" of childhood experience becomes increas-

ingly replaced by conventional and culturally described

stereotypic ways of experiencing.

Huxley (195*0 talks at

length about the adverse effects of this social indoctrination.

Support for my suspicion that younger age groups may

have a relatively livelier imagery code than older age groups
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comes from the investigations of eidetic imagery.

Haber and

Haber (I964) found eight percent of their sample of
151 ele-

mentary school children to experience eidetic images, whereas
this trait seems to occur extremely rarely among American

adults (Neisser I967).

Again, apart from the obvious increas-

ing importance of language with age, cultural reasons have

been offered?

"... the capacity for vivid imagery has little

survival value and less social acceptability" (Holt, 196^, p.
262).

This cultural explanation is supported by Doob's

(1964) finding that eidetic imagery was quite common among

rural Nigerian adults, and uncommon among urban members of
the saiae tribe.
In this present study it may not be possible to com-

pare the imagery ability of younger children with that of an

older group, since

I

am employing a memory task*

I

expect

the older children to perform better on such a task because

of their greater memory capacity and possibly other factors,
such as greater alertness, confidence, more proficient memory

strategies, etc.

In this case, no inference can be made

about the amount of imagery utilized by either group, and no

hypothesis is stated in this regard.

Only in the unlikely

case that the younger perform better than the older in the

high- imagery condition, would

I

find strong evidence for the

notion that the younger make more extensive use of imagery
than the older.
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On the other hand, it can be hypothesized that
the

relative facilitation with imagery as compared to language
is greater for a younger age group,

Differential memory ca-

pacity does not affect this wi thin-group comparison*

It is

in this respect that the Bower-Schachtel-Huxley speculations

should show up.

Younger children with less language profic-

iency and less socialization should depend on their imagery
code as compared to their linguistic coding to a greater

extent than older children.

Phrased differently, the percen-

tage of thought processes conducted via the imagery code out

of the total amount of thought processes, should decrease as
a function of increasing age.

Again, some justification for

this hypothesis comes from Kates et al. (1962a) with their

finding of a dissociation between words and their referents
for younger children in comparison to older children.

In

their inferiority on categorization of words as compared to
categorization of objects, in their greater number of cate-

gories required for words than for objects, as well as in
their greater frequency of adequate categorizations accompan-

ied by inadequate verbalizations, the younger age group

resembled the older language-matched deaf group.
£sM^2£il§^-:M^fiS£«

No difficulty should exist in

the prediction of the additive effects of deafness and age.
If my previous hypotheses are justified, then an obvious

further prediction should be to the effect that the differences of facilitation between imagery and language should be
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greater for a younger deaf group than for an older hearing
group.

The effects of both deafness and younger age on the

relation between imagery and language were hypothesized to
fall into the same direction.
It is more difficult to predict the effects of

deafness and age when these two variables are expected to
work in opposite directions.

We may ask, which factor is

more potent, deafness or age, in determining the relative
stress of imagery versus language?

In looking for an answer,

the comparison of the older deaf group with the younger

language-matched hearing group would be a sensible starting
point.

These two groups have presumably equal language pro-

ficiency, thus, differences in their facilitation with imagery

should not be due to language differences.

If age is the

more potent variable, the younger hearing subjects should
place more stress on their imagery code relative to their
linguistic coding than the older but deaf subjects.

If

deafness is the stronger variable, it should override the age
effect, and older deaf subjects should evidence greater

imagery-language differences than younger hearing subjects.

And thirdly, of course, the effects may be equal.
There is no strong evidence indicating either

direction.

The reported dissociation between words and their

referents was similar for the deaf group and the language-

matched hearing group (Kates et al. 1962a).

Blanton (I968)

also reported similar word association patterns for these

28

two groups.

The predominance of word-object associations

over word-word associations was shown by the
deaf as well as
by the younger hearing. On the other hand,
we remember that
deaf adolescents used significantly more
concrete verbalizations than either the age-matched or the
language-matched

hearing subjects (Kates et al. 1962a).

While concrete words

are liable to evoke more imagery than abstract words,
as

previously discussed,

I

would also speculate that the use of

concrete language may be an indication of the use of imagery.
In other words, the higher occurrence of concrete
verbaliza-

tions among the deaf as compared to the younger hearing may

indicate that the former make more relative use of their

imagery code than the latter.
On intuitive grounds

speculation.

I

would also favor such a

Younger subjects, according to my theoretical

discussions, rely more heavily on imagery because of their

relative language deficiency and their lesser extent of socialization.

With age, more and more weight is put on the ling-

uistic code, and the gap between imagery and language is
narrowed.

In the case of the deaf, such language development

begins much later and progresses much slower.

For a longer

than usual time the deaf rely and depend on imagery as a cog-

nitive coding system.

Such initial and prolonged strengthen-

ing of the imagery code in the deaf may not be offset by later

language development to the same degree as for hearing persons*
Since socialization may be one factor unfavorable for extensive
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use of imagery, it should be noted that deaf adolescents are

probably less communicative , even though they may possess the
same proficiency with language, than the language-matched

hearing subjects.

The deaf have less opportunity for social-

ly validating their cognitions, and their thought processes

may be more idiosyncratic and •closed* (Kates et alo 1962a).
Such egocentrism may point to a strong prevalence of the

imagery code, since it is this code which is so uniquely

tailored for private experience.

In summary, I would predict

that deafness may have a greater impact than age on the

relative importance of imagery as compared to language.
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Hypotheses
1.

Total recognition scores in a short term memory
task will
be higher when
a.

the stimuli consist of colors than when the stimuli consist of color-words,

b.

the stimuli consist of color- words than when the

stimuli consist of abstract low- imagery words,
c.

the stimuli consist of colors than when the stimuli consist of abstract low-imagery words.

2.

The recognition scores in a short term memory task using

colors as stimuli will be higher for the deaf groups
than for the hearing groups matched on age, IQ and socio-

economic background.
3»

There will be greater differences between
a.

the recognition scores for color stimuli and color-

word stimuli,
b.

the recognition scores for color-word stimuli and

abstract low- imagery word stimuli, and
c.

the recognition scores for color stimuli and abs-

tract low-imagery word stimuli

for the deaf than for the hearing.
^.

There will be greater differences between
a.

the recognition scores for color stimuli and

color-word stimuli.

•

b.

the recognition scores for color- word stimuli

and abstract low-imagery word stimuli, and
c.

the recognition scores for color stimuli and

abstract low-imagery word stimuli
for the younger groups than for the older groups.

There will be greater differences between
a.

the recognition scores for color stimuli and

color-word stimuli,
b.

the recognition scores for color- word stimuli

and abstract low-imagery word stimuli, and
c.

the recognition scores for color stimuli and

abstract low-imagery word stimuli
for the younger deaf group than for the older hearing

group

There will be greater differences between
a.

the recognition scores for color stimuli and

color-word stimuli,
b.

the recognition scores for color- word stimuli

and abstract low»imagery word stimuli, and
c.

the recognition scores for color stimuli and

abstract low-imagery word stimuli
for the older deaf group than for the younger hearing

group matched on language comprehension, IQ and socioeconomic background.

CHAPTER

II

METHOD
Subjects

Four groups of 1? adolescents per group were

employed*

The first group was drawn from the lower ages

of the Middle School of the Clarke School for the Deaf in

Northampton, Massachusetts.
eleven years.

These pupils had a mean age of

Only deaf subjects with hearing losses of ?0

decibels or more in the better ear, who have hearing parents, and whose onset of deafness occurred before the age

of three, were included in this study.

The Clarke School

for the Deaf trains its students in the oral method, dis-

couraging

handr-s4gtta3rs-.

Due to the scarcity of subjects

and due to the loss of one boy out of the original experi

mental group of 18 subjects, the sexual balance in this
group was slightly tipped:

girls and

7

boys.

this group consisted of 10

We will refer to this group as the

younger deaf group.
The second group consisted of an equal number of

adolescents selected from the Florence Grammar School in
Northampton, Massachusetts, and matched with the first
group on the variables of age, IQ and socioeconomic background.

This group consisted of 9 girls and 8 boys.

A

measure of language comprehension was obtained from the
subjects comprising the second group, based on the average

•
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of the word and paragraph meaning scores of the Stanford

Achievement Teste

This group will be referred to as the

younger heading group or as the language matched hearing
group
The third group consisted again of deaf adoles-

cents drawn from the Clarke School for the Deaf, and

matched with the previous groups on the variables of IQ
and socioeconomic background.

This group was also matched

with the younger hearing group on their language comprehension.

It may be interesting to note here, that an

estimation of the level of language comprehension for this

group has been employed successfully.

The Stanford Achieve-

ment Test is administered bi-annually to all students in
the Clarke School for the Deaf, for the purpose of assess-

ing their linguistic progress. In order not to interfere

with this testing cycle, this group's level of language
comprehension at the time of this study was estimated from
their most recent test scores (November 1970) and from

existing data about their rate of linguistic progress.
This procedure had been used successfully on two previous

occasions (Kates, personal communication).

At the time of

this study, the actual current Stanford Achievement Test

scores were obtained.

Although the estimated scores were

Invalid for most individuals, for the group as a whole the

predicted mean score and the actual mean score were almost
identical (5*78 and 5.80 respectively).

After the matching

of language comprehension with the younger
hearing group,
this present group had a mean age of 16.4 years
.
This
group, as the second group, consisted of
I

9

girls and

8 boys.

will refer to this group as the older deaf group
or as

the language matched deaf group.
The fourth group consisted of hearing adolescents

from the Northampton High School and the John F. Kennedy

Junior High School, both in Northampton, Massachusetts.
This group was matched with all other groups on IQ and so-

cioeconomic background, and matched specifically with the

older deaf group on age*
girls and

8 boys.

I

Again, this group consisted of 9

will refer to this group as the older

hearing group.
The matching of IQ of these groups had been in-

tended to be based on the Picture Arrangement, Block Design

and Coding subtests of the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
children and the corresponding subtests of the Wechsler

Adult Intelligence Scale for subjects over the age of 16.
It had been indicated that the deaf and the hearing do not

differ significantly on these particular subscales (Levine
1956)

j

and a variety of studies of the deaf have employed

this matching procedure (Kates et al, 1962a, Moore I968,

Kates I969).

These performance-IQ subscales have been

employed in the matching of both deaf groups and the older
hearing group.

In the case of the younger hearing group,

the performance scores (nonverbal) of the school-adminis-

o
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tered Otis-Lenon Mental Ability Test
were used, since the
subjects in question were not available
for any additional
time.

The Hollingshead scale (1957) was used
to provide
a numerical rating of the fathers 9
occupations for matching

the groups on socioeconomic level.

Although the hearing

groups did yield somewhat lower mean scores for
this variable, the appropriate t-tests did not reach the
.05 significance level
No subjects were employed in this study who had

physical disabilities other than deafness in the case of
the deaf, or who showed emotional disturbance.

All subjects

were screened for adequate color vision, using the Ishihara
color plates.
Subjects of all groups were selected from the

respective school records.

In the case of the older hearing,

voluntary cooperation was then requested from these adolescents, and none of them refused.

The public schools in-

volved in this study, i.e., the schools supplying our hearing subjects, required the parents of the selected youngsters
to give their permission for participation in the experiment.

Again, no parents refused to sign the letter that we com-

posed for this purpose (Appendix A).
Originally, 18 subjects had been included in each

experimental group.

One boy was eliminated from the younger

deaf group, after displaying acting out behavior during the
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experiment.

One boy of the older deaf group left school on

the day of the experiment and was not available for testing.
On the last day of testing the younger hearing group, one

boy had forgotten his glasses and could not see the stimuli

used during testing.

In order to balance the groups, one

boy with strikingly low experimental scores was dropped

from the older hearing group.

The matching of the result-

ing four groups, containing 17 subjects each, is shown in

Table 1.
The last three groups, namely a deaf group, an

age-matched hearing group and a language-matched hearing
group, are often employed in research of the deaf, based on
the method of Kates et al. (1962a)

(Kates I969, Moore I968).

This design allows the assessment of the effect of deafness,

when the deaf group is compared to the age-matched hearing
group.

In comparing the deaf group with the language-matched

(younger) hearing group, statements could be made about the

effects and quantitative aspects of language development.
No valid statements about age effects could be made from

this comparison, since age and deafness were confounding

variables and alleged age effects could well be due to qualitative effects of deafness.

In order to assess the effect

of age, different age groups within the deaf and hearing

groups have to be compared.

It is for this reason that a

younger deaf group, matched on age with the younger hearing
group is included in the present study.
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TABLE 1

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS FOR AGE, IQ, SOCIOECONOMIC
BACKGROUND AND WRITTEN LANGUAGE COMPREHENSION.

Group

Age a

IQ

13205

109.35

3.29

6:90

10.11

1.77

130.82

109.17

3.94

5.87

5.^7

10.79

1.15

.56

196.35

107.29

3.05

5.87

11.46

10.11

1.72

1.34

196.58

108.00

3.82

11.03

9.02

1.75

SE D

.

LA 0

Younger deaf
M
SD

Younger Hearing
M
SD

Older Deaf
M
SD

Older Hearing
M

SD

Note: N = 17
a - in months.
b - Hollingshead Socioeconomic Index
c - Stanford Reading Achievement in grade level

I

/

•
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In summary,

there are four groups

i

two deaf groups

at two age levels and two hearing groups at those same two

age levels, with the older deaf group being matched on lang-

uage comprehension with the younger hearing group.

This

design allows a powerful investigation of the effects of deaf-

ness and age, since each variable is assessed and compared at
two levels.

Statements about deafness are based on the com-

parison of the deaf with the hearing at two different age
levels (11 years and 16.4 years), and statements about age
effects are based on comparing younger with older subjects in
two qualitatively different conditions.

Stimulus Materials.
The stimulus materials consisted of three sets of

14 4x6->inch cardboard cards.

These cards were white on the

side showing the stimulus, and gray on the reverse side.

The

first set consisted of two identical series of seven colors as
stimuli, one side of each card showing a single color in its

entirety.

The colors have been chosen for their unambiguous

verbal coding and for their monosyllabic labels.
ing colors were included:

white and gray.
ulus.

The follow-

red, blue, green, black, brown,

Color is in itself a precious and rare stim

>

It appeals directly to the imagery code, i.e. percep-

tion of a color results in direct sensory representation, not

ruling out the possibility of additional verbal coding.

I

The

39

color is in itself a referent without being a bulky
object.

Only geometrical figures may possess similar stimulus
qualities.
The second set of stimuli consisted of two iden-

tical series of the corresponding seven color- words • RED,
BLUE, GREEN , BLACK, BROWN, WHITE, GRAY.

Memory for these

words should rest principally on the capacity of the ling-

uistic cognitive coding system.

Since these words are

highly concrete and have intuitively a high imagery evoking
value, dual coding may occur here, too.

During pilot work,

children as well as adults frequently reported experiencing

color imagery with these words.

A third set of two identical series of seven stimuli was employed, consisting of abstract low imagery-evoking

words, matched with the color- words on number of syllables

and approximate frequencies of occurrence (Thorndike and

Lorge 19

The selection of these words has been done in

close cooperation with experienced teachers and researchers
of the deaf, insuring that the youngest deaf pupils were

familiar with the use of these stimuli.
has been composed:

The following list

HOPE, MIND, TIME, LAW, FACT, COST, TRUTH.

The frequencies of all verbal stimuli as well as the avail-

able imagery evoking values (Paivio et al. 19 68) are listed
in Table 2.
In summary, the three sets of stimuli should

differ in their appeal to the imagery code and to the ling-

to

TABLE

2.

FREQUENCIES ACCORDING TO THORNDIKE & LORGE

AVAILABLE IMAGERY EVOKING VALUE

»I«

(I9W

AND

ACCORDING TO PAIVIO,

YUILLE & MADIGAN (I968) OF THE EMPLOYED VERBAL STIMULI
•
Stimulus

G

T

L

Stimulus

G

T

L

I

RED

AA

M

M

TIME

AA

M

M

4.1

GREEN

AA

M

M

HOPE

AA

M

M

3*8

BLACK

AA

M

M

MIND

AA

M

M

3-0

WHITE

AA

M

M

LAW

AA

M

871

3.7

BLUE

AA

M

989

FACT

AA

700 M

2.2

BROWN

AA

600 M

COST

AA

700 903

3o6

GRAY

AA

700 891

TRUTH

AA

700 698

2»7

"

3*3 = Mean

The column under »G» states the word's occurrence per million
words. An entry of •AA indicates 100 occurrences or more
per million. The columns under »T« and •L give the number
of occurrences in approximately 4§ million words of the Thorndike general count of 1931, and the lorge magazine count respectively o An •M in the T column means that the word was
one of the 500 commonest by the Thorndike count, and occurred
from 800 to 100 000 or more times per tyj million words. An
•M* in the L column means that the word occurred 1000 times
or more in the Lorge magazine count. The column 'I' gives
the Paivio et al. (1968) imagery evoking values. The
obtained Mean of the I's of 3.3 can be considered a low
imagery evoking value.
1

1

l
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uistic code.

Colors should be coded primarily in the form of

imagery, but verbal coding may also occur.

Color words should

travel predominantly in a linguistic code, but may evoke

imagery as well.

There should be less imagery coding and more

linguistic coding involved with the color- words than with the
colors.

This trend is followed further in the abstract words,

which should be restricted even more to the linguistic coding
system and which should have less, if any, opportunity to

give rise to imagery, especially in the present design where
stimuli were presented fairly rapidly and imagery of these

words was not encouraged.

.

Thus, the assessment regarding cog-

nitive codes was done in a gradual fashion.

Performance with

colors was compared with performance with concrete words, and
the latter was contrasted with abstract words.

The same

hypothesized relationships should hold in both instances.

An

over- all measure was the comparison of the extremes on this
continuum, namely, colors versus abstract words.

Differences

in performance with these stimuli were attributed to the use

and capacity of the imagery code on the one hand and use and
facilitation of linguistic coding on the other hand.
In addition there were 18 3x3-inch cards with num-

bers

ori

them.

Subjects were required to count, in order to

insure a no-rehearsal delay in the chosen procedure.

All

numbers were below 100, and it was insured that this did not
exceed the counting capacity of the youngest deaf children.

k2

Procedure.

Subjects were tested in groups of three in a room
at their respective schools.

Each such group contained mem-

bers of both sexes, i.e. a group consisted either of two

girls and one boy or of two boys and one girl.

Upon enter-

ing the room, the adolescents sat down at a long table with

spaces between themselves, facing the experimenter.

In most

cases, rapport between subjects and experimenter had been

established at the previous IQ-testing and language-testing
sessions.

This rapport may have been slightly different with

the older hearing as compared to the older deaf group.

For

many older deaf students, recent IQ scores had been available
for the purpose of matching the groups, and no meeting before
the actual experiment had been necessary.

As a result, the

experimenter met many of these adolescents for the first time
when they walked into the testing room.

The older hearing

students, on the other hand, had had two opportunities to

establish a cordial relationship with the experimenter, in
addition to the circumstance that verbal communication was

facilitated with this group.

This imbalance may have been

partially remedied through the experimenter's assistant who
was familiar to and on friendly terms with the deaf adolescents
but a stranger to the hearing students before the experiment.
A further measure of improving rapport with the older deaf

subjects was employed by giving them some candy before the
testing.

Rapport with all of the younger children was

excellent; they were also promised to receive a candy-bar

after the test.

During the experimental situation itself,

all groups received the same treatment.

Communication was

restricted to the written instructions, demonstrations and
gestures, and occasional vocalizations when necessary.

Upon being seated, each subject received the first

instruction card from the experimenter's assistant.

CAED I.
This is not a school test.
Don't worry.
Do the best you can.
The experimenter himself was standing behind a table

facing the subjects at a distance of about 3| yards from the
subjects.

On the table in front of him was a display panel,

also facing the subjects, and at a distance of 3 yards from
the subjects' seats.

The instructions were conveyed through

a combination of typed instruction cards and corresponding

demonstrations by the experimenter.

If the test series for a

particular group began with the color stimuli, the next
instruction card read as follows.

CARD II.
I will show you some colors.
Think about the pretty colors.
Do not say the names of the colors.
I will put the colors on the table.
Remember where I put them.
When the subjects looked up after reading the card,
the experimenter held a stimulus card in a vertical position
in front of him, with the side consisting of the color stimu-

lus facing the subjects.

Then he placed the card face down on
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the display panel, so that the subjects could only see
the

gray back of the card.

He would repeat this procedure for

all seven stimulus cards, placing them in a row on the dis-

play panel, from the subjects' right to left.

Then the

assistant placed the next instruction card in front of each
subject.

CARD III.
Then I will
You say the
as fast
When I show

show you a number.
number.
Begin with that number and count
as you can count.
you a color, stop counting.

Now the experimenter held up one of the 3x3~inch
cards showing a number.

He and the assistant counted out

loud starting with the shown number, and with appropriate
gestures they persuaded the subjects to do likewise.

After

all three adolescents had apparently understood the task at

hand and were counting out loud rapidly, the experimenter

dropped the card with the number and in its place presented
a pre-designated duplicate of one of the seven color cards.

The subjects stopped counting and received the next instruction card along with an answer sheet (Appendix B) from the

assistant
CARD IV
Now guess which card on the table has the color like
this one.
Now look at the Examples on your paper.
There are seven boxes in each row.
There is a box for each card on the table.
The first box is for the firs't card on the table,
and the last box is for the last card on the
table and so on.
Now let's do Example 1.
Mark the box that has this color.

Example 1.

-After subjects had marked oheir answer,

answer card was turned over.
by general excitement.

the correct

This act was usually followed

The experimenter and the assistant

would spend as much time as necessary to insure that all subjects understood this scoring procedure correctly.

Then the

experimenter assembled all stimulus cards and rearranged them
for the next practice trial, while the assistant presented
the next instruction card.

CARD V.
Let's do it again.
I will put 7 colors on the table.
Remember where I put them.
Then begin to count from the number that I show you.
V/hen I show you a color, stop counting.
Now guess which card on the table has the color like
this one.

Then mark your answer next to Example 2.
Ready?

After the subjects indicated their understanding,
a test trial of the actual experimental procedure ensued.

The experimenter presented and exposed each of the seven

colors for about one second, placed it face down on the dis-

play panel and promptly presented the next color.

The pre-

sentation time was made roughly identical for all cards with
the aid of a metronome.

The experimenter had built a small

portable metronome which he carried in his pocket and which
delivered a loud periodic click by way of an earplug, inaudible to anyone else.

Immediately after presentation of all

seven memory stimuli, the experimenter started a stop watch

o
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with his right hand and presented a 3x3-inch number card
with
his left hand.
The subjects read the number and continued
counting out loud.

After exactly

3

seconds the experimenter

dropped the number in his left hand and exposed the probe card
with his right hand.

The subjects stopped counting and pro-

ceeded to remember and score the matching color card among the
cards on the display panel.

After all subjects scored their

responses, the experimenter turned the correct card over and
again insured that the scoring procedure was properly understood.
It was considered very important to insure the sub-

jects' proper understanding and to diminish their insecurity,

which may be a salient factor especially with the deaf (Kates,
Yudin and Tiffany 1962b) and with the younger hearing children.
At this point an attempt was made to dissipate any remaining

signs of ambivalence.

Then the next instruction card was

presented.

CARD VI
Be very careful.
Let's see how many you can get right.
Remember, do not say the names of the colors.
Just think about the pretty colors.

Now the actual testing began.

Eight trials were

conducted identical to the second practice trial.

After show-

ing the memory probe at the end of each trial, the experimenter

waited 15 seconds before assembling the stimulus cards from
the display panel.

Following the fourth and the eighth trial

the correct answer card was exposed to the subjects after they

^7

had made their choices.
tain the subjects

1

This procedure was believed to main-

interest and to provide incentive.

Had

the correct card been exposed aftei each trial,
many subjects

would probably have become discouraged by the difficulty
of
the task.

After eight trials with the color stimuli, the next
stimulus condition was introduced with the following instruction card.

CARD VII.
We will continue like this.
Nov/ each card will have a word on it.
I will show you the words before we begin.
Think about the words. Do not say them.
The experimenter exposed all seven word cards on the

display panel to the subjects, so that the latter would become
familiar with the new stimuli.

Eight trials were conducted

with these words, whereupon the last stimulus condition, the

other set of words, was introduced with the corresponding
instructions and demonstration.
CARD VIII.
We will continue like this.
words
No w the cards will have Mldifferent
mm
WW —WM —
m
— on them.
I will show you the words before we begin.
Think about the words.
Do not say them.
ii

f-

i

ii

ri

p

i

'

'

*

I

i

In case the first experimental stimulus condition

consisted of either the color words or the abstract words, the
instructional procedures were identical as those described
above, except that all occurrences of 'color* or 'colors'

were replaced by the appropriate reference to 'word' or 'words'.

Each change of stimulus conditions was announced by the appro1
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priate instruction card and by exposure of the new
stimuli.
The instructions were typed double spaced on 5x7-

inch index cards, each sentence making up a separate line.

These instructions had been selected and phrased in close

collaboration with experienced teachers and researchers of
the deaf and geared toward to level of comprehension of the

younger deaf pupils employed in this study.
As already mentioned, eight trials were conducted

with each set of stimuli.

Within these eight trials, six of

the seven stimuli were probed at least once and two of these

six were probed twice.

This tactic was designed in order to

make it difficult for subjects to devise strategies
dict the next stimulus probe.

to pre-

The position of the stimulus

probe was handled in a similar manner; six of the seven positions were probed at least once and two of these six occured

twice within the block of eight trials.

The order of the

probed positions and the order of the probed stimuli as well
as the order of all seven stimuli within each separate trial

were balanced for each eight-trial block of any stimulus
condition.

For our three stimulus conditions there were six

ways of ordering these conditions.

The balancing of stimuli

and positions, as described in detail above, was carried out
across these six possible combinations of the stimulus conditions.

Since the children were tested in small groups of

three, it was possible to test each threesome of a particular

subject group with a unique combination of the stimulus con-
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ditions, as well as with a unique arrangement of
all stimuli
and of all probed stimuli and positions. This
balanced

treatment was equated for our four subject groups.
One slight mistake occured in regard to the bal-

ancing of the probed stimulus positions.

It was discovered

after the experiment that the abstract words were probed 16
times in the first and last positions, whereas the color-

words were probed 14 times in those end positions and colors

only 10 times.

This treatment was, of course, identical for

all subject groups and thus, did not cloud the comparison of

subject groups with each other.

It may, however, have influ-

enced the overall comparison of stimulus conditions.

It

could be argued, for example, that the colors constituted a

more difficult condition than the other two, because of the
fewer number of end positions.

Thus, the actual differences

between colors and abstract words and between colors and
color- words may possibly be somewhat greater than those

found in this experiment.

This error was due to the last

minute reduction of the number of trials from ten to eight
per subject per condition.
Each subject received a total of 24 trials, eight
trials of each stimulus condition, and the total time spent
by subjects in the experimental room was approximately 30

minutes.

The testing of our hypotheses was based on 136

observations per stimulus condition per subject group.

50

The present procedure has been derived from exten-

sive pilot work with deaf and hearing adolescents, as
well as
some testing with college adults.

Various paired-associate

tasks had been employed, but were abandoned in favor of the

card-guessing technique described by Calfee (I969).

Using

this technique, the obtained recognition scores were deemed
to be too high to leave room for variation and for meaning-

ful comparison So

With the aim of reducing the accuracy of

recognition without, however, introducing confounding factors,
several variations of this card-recognition method were tested.
The stimulus list was lengthened, stimulus response time was

shortened and a delay condition was introduced.

Extensive

discussion of this exciting work is furnished in Appendix

C.

51

CHAPTER

III

RESULTS
Hypotheses.

Hypothesis One was not supported.

Overall recog-

nition scores were not significantly different for the colors,
color-words or abstract words.
to stimulus condition,

with

significance (Table 3).

The overall main effect due

F( 2,128)

= 1.57, did not achieve

Although there was a weak indication

of the predicted direction, this tendency only reached the .1

level of significance (F(l,128) =

3. 11)

when comparing colors

and abstract words (Myers I966, Chapter I3).

Table 3 entails

the analysis of variance for the two-between and one- within

variable appropriate to our experimental design.

Table 4

gives the means and standard deviations of the experimental

groups for their performance with the three types of stimuli.
Figure 1 is a graphic representation of the total recognition
scores obtained in the experiment.

experiment are listed in Appendix

All raw scores for the
D.

Hypothesis Two was not supported.

Recognition

scores of all deaf adolescents for colors were not significantly higher than those for all hearing subjects.
the two younger groups

t alt en

Although

alone seem to indicate the pre-

dicted direction (Figure 1), the F(l,32) = 1.9, which is
clearly not significant.
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Table 3.

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE TOTAL EXPERIMENTAL
DESIGN
TWO BETWEEN (AGE, HEARING) AND ONE WITHIN
(STIMULI)

,

WITH

VARIABLES.

Source

Sam of Squares

Mean Square

F

1

46.1225

20.49

df

A

46.1225

H

0.5931

1

0.5931

.26

C

6.7059

2

3.3529

1.57

AH

8.2402

1

8.2402

3.67

AC

3.5686

2

1.7843

.84

HC

1.2157

2

O.6078

.29

143.9216

64

2.2488

IO.I569

2

5.0784

273.0196

128

2.1330

S(AH)

AHC
SC(AH)

P

.001

,J

A as Age
H = Hearing-Deafness
C = Stimuli

•

2.85

.1

.1
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TABLE

/+•

MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS OF THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL
GROUPS
IN REGARD TO THEIR PERFORMANCE WITH COLORS, COLORWORDS
AND

ABSTRACT WORDS.

Grou P

Colors

Color-words

Abstract words

Younger deaf
M

3.06

2.47

3.O6

SD

1.55

I.65

1.55

2.4-7

3.00

2.24

1.50

1.49

1.20

M

3.76

3.65

2.82

SD

1.71

1.60

.87

M

4.29

3.76

3.71

SD

1.42

1.13

1.56

Younger hearing
M
;

SD

Older deaf

Older hearing

1
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FIGURE !•
SUMS OF RECOGNITION SCORES OF FOUR EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS
FOR
COLORS, COLOR- WORDS AND ABSTRACT WORDS.
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older deaf
younger hearing
younger deaf
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Hypothesis Three was not supported.

Differences

between recognition scores for the three stimulus
conditions

were not significantly greater for bhe deaf than for
the
hearing.

There was only a weak interaction between the var-

iables hearing-deafness and the stimuli (HC), with F(2,128)
= .29

(Table 3).

Individual contrasts computed for each age

level separately did not yield significance.

The difference

between color-words and abstract words for the younger groups

reached the .1 level of significance, with F(l,64) = 3.65.
This indication of a difference, however, pointed in the

opposite direction than predicted.

In other words,

the

younger deaf group was hypothesized to do much worse with the
abstract words than with the color words, when compared to
the younger hearing, but our finding was that the younger

deaf performed even better with the abstract words than with
the color words.

Hypothesis Four was not supported.

Overall, the

younger groups did not evidence greater differences between
their recognition scores for the three types of stimuli than
the older groups.

The interaction between the variables of

age and stimulus conditions (AC) was low, with
.84 (Table 3).

F(

2,128) =

The highest level cf significance achieved

by any individual contrast is only. .2 in the case of compart-

ing the performance on colors with the performance on ab-

stract words.

This weak indication of a tendency points in

the opposite direction than predicted, i.e. the older groups
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performed somewhat poorer with the abstract words than with
the colors, whereas the younger groups showed no difference
in their performance with these stimuli.

The differences between the performance of the

younger and the older was computed separately for the deaf
and for the hearing.

Only the difference between performance

with color words and performance with abstract words in the
case of comparing younger and older deaf children fell

between the .1 and .05 significance levels.

This tendency

was again in the opposite direction, i.e. the older deaf

performed poorer with abstract words than with color words,
as predicted, whereas the younger deaf showed the reverse.

The interaction between the variables of age and stimulus

conditions for the deaf alone did not reach significance,
with P(2,64) = 1.89

(Table 5).

Hypothesis Five was not supported.

The differences

between performance with any of the stimuli was not greater
for the younger deaf than for the older hearing.

Comparing

these two groups at any one stimulus level did not yield

significance.

Hypothesis Six was not supported.

The differences

between performance with the three types of stimuli were not

greater for the older deaf group than for the language-

matched younger hearing group.

Although the difference

between performance on colors and performance on abstract

TABLE

5.

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE YOUNGER AND OLDER

Source

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

A

7.

6863

1

7.6863

C

4.0?84

2

2.0392

71.0588

32

2.2206

8.7843

2

4.3922

148.4706

64

2.3199

S(A)

AC
SC(A)

.89

1.89
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words was greater in absolute numbers for the older deaf
than for the younger hearing, namely 16 and 4 respectively,

this difference did not reach significance.

A separate

analysis of variance was computed for these two groups.
The interaction between the group differences (age and hearing combined) and the different stimulus conditions were

non-significant, with P(2,64) = .58 (Table 6).

Post Hoc Analyses.
Stimuli.

The experimental hypotheses, except

Hypothesis Two, address themselves to the effects due to the
three types of stimuli and to the interaction between the

stimulus effects and other variables.

The hypothesis of

an overall stimulus effect was not supported at the .05

level of significance, although a tendency at the .1 level
of significance pointed in the predicted direction*

No

effect due to the stimulus conditions could be found when

comparing the younger groups alone.

Figure 1 may convince

the reader quickly of the futility of such a search.

A

separate analysis of variance was computed for the older
groups, and the indication of a tendency emerged here.

Stim-

ulus effects barely missed the .1 level of significance for

these groups, with F(2,64) = 2.3I (Table 7).

Comparing

their performance on colors with their performance on abstract words yielded F(l,64) = 4.6, which was significant at
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TABLE

6.

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR DEAF AND HEARING GROUPS MATCHED

LANGUAGE ACHIEVEMENT.

Source

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

P

p

H

18.1275

1

18.1275

9.25

.005

c

11.5^90

2

5.7745

2.56

.1

S(H)

62.8627

32

I.9645

2.6078

2

1.3039

143.8431

64

2.2475

HC
SC(H)

•58
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TABLE

7.

ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR THE OLDER DEAF AND OLDER HEARING
GROUPS MATCHED ON AGE.

Source
H

Sum of Squares

df

Mean Square

F

62?5

1

6.6275

3.25

C

10.0196

2

5.0098

2.31

8(H)

62.7059

32

1.9596

2.4902

2

1.2451

138.8235

64

2.1691

HC
SC(H)

6.

•58

P
.1
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the .05 level of significance.

There was also an indication

of a stimulus effect when comparing the older deaf
group

with the language matched younger hearing group, with F(2,
64) = 2.56 reaching the .1 level of significance (Table 6).
In summary,

the overall stimulus effects were in

the predicted direction, but weak; when taking the older

groups alone, these stimulus effects grew stronger, traveling on the margin of significance (see also Figure 2).
Age.

(Figure 2),

There was a great overall effect due to age

This effect was significant beyond the .001

level, with F(l,64) = 20.49

(Table

3)

Since there was only

•

a tendency for an age effect among the deaf, with F(l,32) =

3.46 falling between the .1 and .05 levels of significance

(Table 5) the hearing groups were assumed to carry the brunt
of the overall age effect.

The deaf age groups did differ

significantly at the .05 level only in regard to their performance with color- words, with F(l,32) =

regard to just these color-words

,

5« 2 9»

It was in

and only in regard to these,

that the two hearing age groups failed to achieve a signifi-

cant difference, with F(l,32) = 2.21.

Figures 3 and 4 show

in graphical form the age differences for the deaf and hear-

ing separately.

Hearing.

No overall differences due to the vari-

able of hearing-deafness were observed (Figure 5), with F
(1,64) - .26 (Table 3).

Such hearing effect was especially

absent in regard to the younger groups.

Averaging the

FIGURE

2.

SUMS OF RECOGNITION SCORES OF OLDER AND YOUNGER
AGE GROUPS

FOR COLORS, COLOR-WORDS AND ABSTRACT WORDS
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Color- Words

Abstract Words
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FIGURE 3.
SUMS OF RECOGNITION SCORES OF OLDER AND YOUNGER
DEAF GROUPS

FOR COLORS, COLOR- WORDS AND ABSTRACT WORDS (DETAIL FROM
FIGURE 1).

Older deaf

Younger deaf

£
70

-

60

-

50

-

ko

-

30

-

Colors

1

Co lor- Words

Abstract Words

64

FIGURE 4
SUMS OF RECOGNITION SCORES OF OLDER AND YOUNGER HEARING
GROUPS

FOR COLORS, COLOR- WORDS AND ABSTRACT WORDS (DETAIL FROM
FIGURE 1)
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FIGURE 5.
SUMS OF RECOGNITION SCORES OF THE COLLECTIVE DEAF
AND HEARING GROUPS FOR COLORS, COLOR- WORDS AND ABSTRACT WORDS
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scores of the younger groups at each stimulus condition

placed these groups on an identical straight line; individual contrasts for the younger groups at any single stimulus

level remained non-significant.

Taking the older groups

alone, an indication of a hearing effect emerged, with F
(1,32) = 3.25 being significant at the .1 level.

The indi-

vidual comparison of the older deaf and hearing subjects in

regard to abstract words yielded F(l,32) =

2.9/1,

which

reached the .1 level of significance.
Age-hearing interaction .

There was a tendency

toward an overall age-hearing interaction, with F(l,64) =
3.67 well exceeding the .1 level of significance (Table 3).
The part played by the older groups in this interaction

reached the .1 level of significance, with F(l,128) =
(Figure 6).

2.9^-

The interaction between the variables of age

and hearing became evident in regard to the abstract words
alone, where F( 1,6*1-) = 5«04 achieved significance at the .05

level (see Figure 8c and the following section dealing with

age-hearing-stimulus interaction)

Another view of the age-hearing interaction invol-

ved the comparison of the older deaf group with their age

matched peers on the one hand and with their language matches
on the other hand (Figure ?).

There was a tendency for the

older deaf to differ from their hearing age peers, with F
(1,32) = 3.25 reaching the .1 level of significance (Table
6).

This tendency seemed to be due mainly to the differences

6?

FIGURE

6.

SUMS OF RECOGNITION SCORES OF OLDER AND YOUNGER
DEAF AND

HEARING GROUPS FOR ALL STIMULUS CONDITIONS.
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Young ;er
I

Older
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FIGURE 7*
SUMS OF RECOGNITION SCORES OF THE OLDER DEAF GROUP AND THEIR

AGE-MATCHED HEARING GROUP AND THEIR LANGUAGE-MATCHED HEARING
GROUP (DETAIL FROM FIGURE 1).
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FIGURE 80
SUMS OF RECOGNITION SCORES OF OLDER AND YOUNGER DEAF AND

HEARING GROUPS FOR COLORS (a.), FOR LOLOR-WORDS (b.) AND
FOR ABSTRACT WORDS (c).
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of these groups in regard to abstract words, where
F(l,32) =

2.9^ was significant at the .1 level*

This same deaf group,

however, differed significantly frcn the language
matched

younger hearing group, with F(l,32) = 9.25 achieving significance at the .005 level (Table 6).

Beside the overall

difference between the older deaf and the language matched

younger hearing, these groups differed significantly in
their performance with colors, with F(l,32) = 7.26 exceeding
the .025 level of significance.

Age-hearing-stimulus Interaction .

There was an

indication of an overall interaction between the variables
of age, hearing and stimulus conditions (AHG), with F(2,128)
= 2.85 falling between the .1 and .05 levels of significance

(Table 3).

This interaction seemed to be due mainly to a

significant interaction between age and hearing in regard to

abstract words,
level.

F(

1,6*0 = 5.0^ being significant at the .05

Figure 8 shows the age-hearing interaction for each

of the stimulus conditions.

Error Analysis.
An extensive analysis of the errors made by all

subjects wa~ conducted.

It was be?ieved that if certain

errors occurred significantly more of ten than other errors,
this would possibly give an indication about some response

bias or mediation process employed by the subjects.

The

occurrence of particular errors would be especially inter-
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esting if such errors were made at list positions further

removed from the correct answer.
Most errors were made one cr two positions removed
from the correct response.

The mean positions removed per

error fell between 1.82 and 2.33 for the different subject

groups and for the different stimulus conditions.

Figure 9

shows the number of errors made at each distance from the

correct response, graphed in curve form for each subject
group. Superimposed is the hypothetical curve that would be

expected if the positions of errors were a matter of chance.
SslS&JL*

The error data regarding color stimuli

are given in Table E(l) of Appendix E e

Errors reaching an

overall significance (t-test for errors within subject
groups) of occurrence at the .05 level included black- brown

and red-green errors, i.e. one member of such a pair was
chosen with significant frequency as the answer, when the

other pair member was the correct answer.

Black-brown errors

were also significant at the .05 level for the deaf collectively and for the younger hearing group.

These same errors

achieved significance at the .025 level for the younger deaf
group.

Red-green errors were significant at the .05 level

for the deaf collectively, and at the .01 level for the older

deaf alone.

Although the overall number of gray- white errors
did not quite reach significance at the .05 level, it may be

worthy to note that these frequently made errors occurred on
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FIGURE 9,

NUMBER OF POSITIONS OF ERRORS REMOVED FROM THE
CORRECT ANSWERS
UNDER ALL THREE STIMULUS CONDITIONS FOR THE
YOUNGER DEAF
(a.),

THE YOUNGER HEARING (b.), THE OLDER DEAF (c),
AND THE OLDER
HEARING (d.).

...

colors
color- words
abstract words
hypothetical curve obtained if the positions of errors were a matter of chance.
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the average throe or more positions
removed from the correct
response. The older hearing group made
a significant number
of gray-White errors at the .05 level.
The only other significant errors at the .05 level were
green-white errors for
the younger hearing group and blue-red as
well as black-red

errors for the older hearing group.

BQl9V-mV&S,*

The error data regarding color-words

are given in Table E(2) of Appendix E.

There was a striking

significant occurrence of BLACK-BROWN errors for all
subject
groups. The significance levels were the following:
.05

for the younger deaf, .01 for the older deaf, and .005 for
the deaf collectively;

.005 for both hearing age groups, and

.001 for the hearing collectively.

Overall significance of

this error compared to all other errors was at the .01 level.

For the younger deaf, RED-GREEN errors occurred

with a frequency at the .05 level of significance.

Both old-

er groups, the hearing as well as the deaf, made frequent

BLUE-GREEN errors at near positions, reaching the .05 level
of significance.

Abstract words .

The error data regarding abstract

words are given in Table E(3) of Appendix E.

The only error

pair that came close to an overall significant occurrence,
but missed the .05 level of significance by a fraction, was
the pair TRUTH-HOPE.

This error occurred with significant

frequency at the .025 level for the deaf collectively as woll
as for the older deaf group alone.

7k

Both deaf groups together also made frequent HOPE-

MIND errors, significant at the .05 level, this
type of
error reaching the .025 significance level for the

younger

deaf c

COST-MIND errors occurred with a frequency at the

•05 level of significance for the younger deaf and at the
.01 significance level for the older hearing.

The younger

hearing made significantly frequent MIND- TIME errors at the
.05 level of significance.

Analysis of Accuracy

Across all subject groups there were

9

values

exceeding 50% recognition in regard to individual color stimuli •

In comparison 5 values above $0% accuracy occurred in

regard to color-words, and

6 such

values were found

vrith

the abstract words, k of these 6 being contributed by the

older hearing group.

Table F in Appendix F shows the recog-

nition accuracy achieved with colors, color-words and abstract
words respectively.
Colors *

Overall, the color red was remembered and

recognized best in comparison to other color stimuli.

The

younger deaf group achieved 65^ accuracy with this color.
Both older groups performed with

ar.

accuracy of $0% or bette~

in regard to the colors gray and green, the older hearing

scoring 60% recognition of gray, and the older deaf recognizing the color green

6yfo

of the time when the end positions

were excluded and only the more difficult middle positions
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were considered.

The strongest score was 7k% recognition

of brown by the older hearing group.

The younger groups

performed poorly in regard to the color black.
£2l2£=]30T&s.

The word RED was recognized 65% of

the time by the older hearing group.

scored

60fo

Both older groups

in regard to WHITE, and both deaf groups
achieved

50% accuracy or better with BLUE.

The younger deaf performed

poorly with BLACK, recognizing this word only two times
out
of the 1? times that it was probed.
Abstract wo^fla.

The younger deaf performed best

in regard to the stimulus FACT, recognizing it
53% of the

time.

The older deaf exceeded 50% recognition with the stim-

ulus COST.

The older hearing group performed well with the

stimuli FACT (71^), LAW (65^), TIME {55%)

9

and TRUTH (50%).

This group, however, did remarkably poorly in regard to COST,

recognizing this stimulus only twice out of the 17 times that
it was probed.

.^i&LZP^MPJL-

Recognition accuracies were also

computed for each stimulus position.

Serial position curves

typical for memory experiments were obtained (Figure 10).
It may be noted that the colors prompted a marked recency

effect when compared to the color- words.

In regard to the

abstract words, the two deaf groups performed identical,
showing both recency and primacy effects.

There was a dif-

ference, however, for the hearing groups.

While the older

hearing showed a primacy effect but no recency effect, the
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FIGURE 10

RECOGNITION PERCENTAGES OF ALL EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS FOR
EACH
SERIAL POSITION OF THE STIMULI WHEH THE STIMULI WERE

COLORS

,

(a.), COLOR-WORDS (b.), AND ABSTRACT WORDS (c).
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younger hearing demonstrated a recency effect but no primacy
effect.

In addition to the described data analyses, we

also computed a correlation matrix for all the variables

measured in this study*

This table is listed in Appendix G.

.
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CHAPTER

IV

DISCUSSION
Hypo theses

The first hypothesis, which predicted that overall

recognition scores would be highest for colors, lowest for
abstract words, with color-words falling in between, cannot
be rejected in face of the overwhelming previous demonstra-

tions (Paivio I969, Bower 1970).

In the present experiment

there was a consistent indication of the predicted direction

regarding this hypothesis.

This indication emerged in the

overall analysis, in the separate analysis for the older
groups and in the recognition values for individual stimuli.

Although the experimenter was most confident in respect to
this hypothesis, the indicated tendencies were not significant.

The reasons for this failure may be manifold.

First,

the error that occurred in balancing the serial positions of

the stimulus probes may have led to better performance with
the color- words and especially with the abstract words.

Had

these latter stimulus conditions not been favored in the easy-

to-remember end positions, the hypothesized trend would probably have been greater.

Second, the performance of both

younger groups and of the older deaf group with respect to
the abstract words may have clouded the picture by introduc-

ing confounding factors.

The younger deaf performed surpris-

ingly well with the abstract words, surpassing their age1

79

matched hearing peers, and equalling the older deaf
who were,
on the average, about five years older.

I

will speculate

below that the abstract words may have been handled in
other^
than-linguistic ways, especially on the part of the younger
deaf.

Had the abstract viords been mediated by strictly ling-

uistic coding processes, as predicted, the hypothesized trend
should have emerged stronger.

Third, a greater number of

observations could have produced the needed significance for
our positive tendency.

Each experimental group yielded I36

observations for each of the three stimulus conditions.

The.

number of subjects was restricted due to the limited number
of available deaf adolescents, and the number of observations

per subject were limited by the duration of the experimental
sessions and by the time involvement that could reasonably
be demanded from the participating schools and from the

subjects themselves.
The remaining hypotheses dealt with differences in

performance due to either deafness or age or both of these
variables.
weak.

In general,

the indications that emerged were

Other indications, while also lacking statistical sig-

nificance, were pointing in the opposite direction than predicted.

I

will briefly discuss some possible reasons for

these negative findings for each of the remaining hypotheses
separately.

Since these explanations may apply to all or

most of the following hypotheses, they shall receive more
detailed attention in a subsequent discussion.

c
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The second hypothesis, which predicted that the

deaf would be better with imagery than the hearing, was
not

substantiate.

It is at least theoretically possible that

the collection of more observations could have yielded the

predicted results, especially in view of the younger deaf's
performance in the predicted direction.

It is also possible

that the color stimuli may not have adequately tapped the

subjects 1 imagery code, as postulated, but that these colors

may have given rise to at least partial linguistic mediation.
That this mediation may have been more pronounced for the

older deaf than for the younger deaf is consistent with the
interpretation offered by Lantz and Lenneberg (I966).
Finally, the deaf's postulated imagery superiority may act-

ually not exist

—

a possibility probed in further detail

below.

Hypothesis Three, regarding the relative differences between imagery and linguistic coding for the deaf

and the hearing, was not supported.

Undesired 'noise* in

the experiment could have led to this failure.

Those parts

of the hypothesis involving performance with abstract words

may have been clouded by the unexpected findings regarding
those words.

And again, failure to show differences may be

due to the absence of such differences.

Under Hypothesis Four, predicting greater differences between facility with imagery and with language for
the younger than for the older, we found no differences

s

81

As before, interfering side-effects and the possibility
of

unpredicted non-articulatory mediation in regard to abstract
words may have had an influence here,

Or we may regard our

hypothesis as refuted; in which case the importance of
imagery as a cognitive code may not decrease with age, but

may continue to be the most crucial cognitive factor for all
age groups.

In that case, we should, indeed, find no widen-

ing of the gap between imagery and language facility over age.

Hypotheses Five and Six did not fare better.

As

previously discussed, the reasons for this ill fate may include experimental shortcomings, special handling of the abstract words by some subject groups, and the counter-hypothesis that imagery may not be decreasing in absolute as well

as in relative importance with increasing linguistic profic-

iency due to age or due to hearing.

Let us now evaluate in

more detail these possible explanations for our failure

to

achieve significant and predicted findings.

More o bs erya.t i on

It is possible that the collec-

•

.

tion of more observations per subject group per stimulus con-

dition could have carved out a cleared picture.

On the other

hand, and especially in the face of some of our unpredicted

indications, an increase in data may not have helped to sup-

port our hypotheses.

While

I

accept the notion that more

data are certainly desirable, and may even be necessary in
the case of .weak effects,

I

will reject this possibility as

the sole explanation for our non-significant findings.

•
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Procedural shortcoming,

it is believed that the

present design of a recognition memory experiment is appro-

priate for the attempt of answering questions that deal with
thinking.

The definition of

«

thinking 1 may rise or fall with

the presence or absence of such processes that we call •mem-

ory

9

.

The activities occurring during the latter process -

either on the concrete neurological level or on abstract conceptual levels - should occur during the former process*

Investigators in general seem to agree with this proposition
(Conrad 19?0, Furth 1971)
It could be postulated that the employed stimulus

material did not tap the proposed mediating processes*
criticism is not without value.

Such

Lantz and Lenneberg (I966)

speculated that linguistic skill may facilitate color recog-

nition in deaf adults, whereas deaf children's color categorization may develop according to different rules.

cussing the stimulus materials above,

I

Y/hile dis-

conceded that verbal

mediation may occur during memorization of colors, and it is
theoretically possible that greater verbal facility may lead
to better performance with colors.

On the other hand, the

error and accuracy patterns, as discussed below, are seen to
give some indication that imagery, as postulated, may have
been employed during the recognition of colors.

From the

standpoint of designing the present experiment there should
be no reason to doubt that the remaining stimuli, namely

color- words and abstract words, would be tapping the subjects

1
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linguistic coding system.

If I am speculating below that
some

subjects may have experienced otherthan-linguistic mediation
with regard to abstract words, then I
am doing this with the
spirit and excitement of discovery, rather
than regarding the
selection of stimuli as a procedural error.
The non-mechanized, almost primitive nature
of the

experimental procedure itself is not seen as an
important
handicap.

The same card-recognition procedure, where the
ex-

perimenter presents and handles the stimulus cards himself,
has been used successfully in previous research
(Atkinson,

Hansen and Bernbach 196&, Hansen I965, Bernbach
196?, Atkinson

and Shiffrin 1968, Calfee 1969)0

While this procedure was

deemed fit to be used with college students (Atkinson and
Shiffrin I968)

,

it may constitute a real advantage over mech-

anized procedures when dealing with younger children.

The

children were actively confronted end involved with the ex-

perimenter, which may have motivated them and maintained their
interest, rather than having to relate to an impersonal, inflex
ible experimental apparatus.

Great care was taken to render

the procedure as smooth and as faultless as possible, and to

eliminate the possibility of an experimenter bias.

To fin-

ally reject the possibility of a faulty stimulus handling
procedure, it should be noted that had any roughness remained
unnoticed, it would have occurred identically for all experi-

mental groups, and could not have caused systematic differences between groups.

o
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Tho error which occurred in balancing the serial

positions of the stimulus probes for the three types of
stimuli has been discussed previously.

Without such error,

performance with color- words and with abstract words could
possibly have been depressed somewhat for all subject groups,
as discussed with regard to Hypothesis One.

While it could

be argued that such depression could have been of different

magnitude for the different subject groups, such effect would
have been negligible due to the small extent of the error.
Thus, it is concluded, that the error in balancing the stim-

ulus probes did not distort the picture regarding differences

between deaf and hearing or between younger and older subjects
The matching of subject groups was the most time

consuming and painstaking endeavor during this study.

While

this matching was very close in most instances (Table 1), two

points could possibly be raised.

First, the matching on IQ

was based on the performance subscales of the Wechsler Adult

Intelligence Scale or on the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for
Children in the case of three subject groups, and it was

based on the performance scores of the Otls-Lenon Mental

Ability Test in the case of the younger hearing subjects.

Mainly because of the presence of a host of confounding factors in the IQ testing situation, the experimenter rejected

the possibility of having introduced a grave systematic bias

due to the employment of the two IQ tests.

Second, there was

a slight difference in socioeconomic background between the
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deaf and the hearing.

However, this difference was statis-

tically non-significant when comparing either groups individ-

ually or when comparing all deaf with all hearing subjects.
Furthermore, the means for all groups fall roughly into the

middle of the socioeconomic scale, where differences should
not weigh heavily.
Finally, the difference in rapport with the older

deaf group as compared to the older hearing group may he men-

tioned again.

The presence of the experimenter*

s

assistant

and the giving of candy were factors counteracting such difference.

Furthermore, there was no actually felt difference

in rapport during the experimental sessions themselves.

In

any case, had such possible difference influenced our results,
this effect would have been to increase the difference of per-

formance between the older deaf and the older hearing groups.
In our experiment we found only a trend of a difference be-

tween these groups in regard to the abstract words.

Assuming

that better rapport does enhance performance, the above con-

siderations would minimize even the small trend that was
found.

Thus, we cannot hope that this point could possibly

explain our negative findings.
In summary, a host of imaginable procedural short-

comings were discussed.

All, except one, were discredited

as possible explanation for our non-significant results.

While the speculation that linguistic mediation may play a

potent role in the memory for colors cannot be rejected.
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this hypothesis is not a preferred one.

Of course, we keep

in mind the possibility that the hypothesized effects may be
so weak, that even small procedural inequities constitute

enough •noise* to drown out the faint whisper we are straining to detect.

The mediation of abstract words.

As mentioned at

various points above, some puzzling performances with the
abstract words were observed.

According to expectations, all

subject groups should have performed worst with these stimuli
than with the other two conditions.

Also, the deaf, being

clearly inferior with language, should have performed worse

with these difficult linguistic stimuli than the hearing.

To

our surprise, the younger deaf group fulfilled neither of
these predictions.

Their total recognition for abstract words

was identical to their recognition for colors, while they did

poorer with color words (Figure 1).

In regard to the abstract

words they surpassed their hearing age peers, and achieved a
total score identical to the latter* s performance with the

linguistically mediated color words.

To complicate matters,

the younger deaf children, with a mean age of 11 years, were

clearly not inferior to their 16 year old deaf friends when
it came to abstract words.

These observations prompted the

investigator to speculate that other-than-linguistic mediating processes may have been at work here.

It may be possible

that the selected abstract words were too difficult to be

handled by the younger deafs» linguistic coding system.

8?

Instead, these youngsters may
have attempted to remember
these stimuli in the form of
visual imagery, and since they
were quit, proficient with this
code, they performed well
with it, showing no differences
between colors and abstract
words.
This possibility is not too far
fetched.
Conrad and
Rush (1965) and Conrad
(1970) demonstrated that some deaf
children use other than articulator
mediation in response
to letters and words, this
mediation possibly being visual
and based on shape.
"... To understand memory processes
more
fully, we have to be able to conceive
of a verbal memory
store which may be full of pictures of
words ..." (Conrad
1970) concludes.

The younger deaf also made frequent TRUTH-

TIME errors, these errors barely missing the
.05 level of
significance.

It could be argued that these two stimuli

could be confused on visual grounds.

This postulated visual

imagery of the words themselves should not be confused
with

our imagery coding system.

The former refers to the visual

perception of a written word, and we have also called this
the

1

visual linguistic code'

(Introduction).

Our imagery

code, on the other hand, is the imagery of the reXejrent of a

word.
The older deaf, on the other hand, may have faced
a dilemma.

They may have unlearned or were in the process of

unlearning the habit of treating difficult words as visual
stimuli, and were attempting to code our abstract words ling-

uistically.

It is possible,

that this changeover from one
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cognitive habit to another may not have been
successful as
yet, resulting in poor performance.
For this group
we

obtained a correlation of .47 (barely missing the
.05 level
of significance) between age and performance
with abstract
words (Appendix G)

.

In other words, as this group grew in

age they became better with these stimuli, which is consistent with our tentative speculations*

This high positive

correlation may be especially striking in comparison with
the substantial negative correlation of ~J*5 between age and

performance with color- words for this group o
tation reminds of Trevoort

c

s

(1967)

teric and exoteric coding methods.

Our interpre-

theory of the deaf's eso-

Under that theory, the

deaf develop an esoteric or idiosyncratic-internal code in

order to deal with their experience.

With maturation the

exoteric or linguistic code gains increasing significance

and gives rise to a competitive conflict between these two
codes.
In order not to risk the reputation of being a

conservative theoretician,

I

may add that the abstract words

may also have been too difficult for linguistic coding by the
younger hearing children.

These children performed roughly

identically on abstract words and on colors, as had the
younger deaf group.

Also, the language achievement scores of

the younger hearing had a substantial positive correlation of
.^5 with performance on color-words, whereas the correlation

of language achievement with abstract word performance reached
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only .13 (Appendix G).

In other words, linguistic skill
is

reflected in this group's handling of color-words

,

as expec-

ted, but does not seem to play a determining
role in the

mediation of abstract words.

Further support for this notion

seems to come from the serial position curve of
this group's

accuracy scores.

In regard to abstract words, this curve is

marked by the absence of a primacy effect, but it shows a
recency effect.

This could mean that the abstract words were

not remembered or rehearsed as a verbal list.
While these bold interpretations are offered only

tentatively, it is believed that some other- than-predicted

mediation processes may have been at work for some subjects,
especially the younger deaf, in regard to the abstract words.
This circumstance may be at least partially responsible for
some of our data's unpredicted directions as well as for the

failure of some tendencies in general to achieve significance.

Especially Hypothesis Four, predicting differences in cognitive processes between younger and older subjects, may have

suffered from this possible complication.

I

suggest that it

may be fruitful to further investigate the coding operations
that are used to deal with marginally familiar linguistic

stimuli.
No differences between the deaf and the hearing.
So far,

the proposed possibilities of explaining our data's

lack of significance have been met with no great enthusiasm,
but only with lukewarm sympathy in very few cases.

It may be
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time to stop looking for •what went wrong 1 and instead take

our data at face value.

Abundant research, much of which

was cited in the Introduction, demonstrated no significant

differences between the deaf and the hearing.
some specific differences to exist, but

I

I

hypothesized

failed to find them.

May it not be possible that there are, indeed, no spectacular
differences between the deaf and the hearing when it comes to
the phenomenon of 'thinking

1

?

Such a view necessitates a change in my theoretical

considerations.

I

had started with the finding that the deaf

are not intellectually inferior to the hearing, although the

deaf are clearly retarded linguistically.

I

reasoned that

such linguistic deficit led to greater use and thereby greater competence of the imagery coding system.

A strong ling-

uistic code, on the other hand, was postulated to make no
special demands on the corresponding imagery code, resulting
in the hearing subjects' inferiority when it comes to imagery.

Loosely speaking, then, cognitive performance or intelligence
was seen as an aggregate of and somewhat of an average between

these two complementary coding systems.

The average would be

the same for the hearing and the deaf, although the latter

possess an inferior linguistic system and superior imagery.
This may not be the case.

It is possible that deaf and hear-

ing populations do not differ in regard to imagery.

And it

may be just this equality that makes them equal intellectually.

In other words, the capacity of the imagery coding
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system is now seen as determining oognitive functioning.

Not by averaging with language, as postulated before,
but
in and by itself.

Our non-significant findings and the view that

there may be no differences between the deaf and the hearing
in regard to imagery, are strongly supported by the most re-

cent review of the literature (Purth 1971).

In general, deaf

subjects were not found to be superior to the hearing in re-

gard to recognition or reproduction of drawings, pictures,
geometrical designs, imbedded figures or imagining to view a
scene from different perspectives.

These tasks are tapping

the capacity of the imagery code, mid

I

had even proposed

some of those tests as a follow-up to the present study.

We

may conclude from these findings that linguistic deficit may
not enhance and strengthen imagery and that greater linguistic
facility may not de-emphasize imagery.

Nor does greater

linguistic skill drastically enhance imagery; if it did, the
hearing should be consistently superior in cognitive functioning to the deaf.

Thus, the growth and capacity of imagery

may simply bo a reflection of a person's experience with tho
world.

Consequently age peers are performing equally well

cognitively, despite drastic differences in language.

This

reminds us of Furth's (I966) interpretation that possible

differences between tho intellectual performance of the deaf
and the hearing may be explained by the deaf population's

relative poverty of experience.
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A corresponding discussion would apply to the var-

iable of age.

It is possible that the imagery coding system

may not decrease in importance over age, counter to the BowerSchachtel-Huxley speculations.

The status of imagery may

merely decrease in obviousness and its power may be yielded
in a more subtle manner.
I

referred to as the

1

This subtlety may be exactly what

anchoring' of all other cognitive pro-

cesses.
Of course, it could be argued that there really are

differences in imagery between the deaf and the hearing, and
between younger and older age groups, but that the matching

procedures prevent such differences from emerging.

The deaf

and the hearing subjects of these studies are usually matched
on non-verbal performance

J.Q..

This procedure could be tanta-

mount to matching the subjects on imagery, which may be the
very factor under investigation.

On the other hand, the

matching on performance IQ can be seen as logically consistent with the view that imagery ability and intellective

ability are somewhat identical.

The follcwing research pro-

posal may or may not get around this controversy.

I

propose

.

to further investigate the role of the imagery coding system

by comparing multilingual foreign speakers with multilingual

native speakers and with monolingual native speakers.

It

could be hypothesized that the acquisition and use of foreign

languages may anchor cognitive processes more firmly in the
imagery code (along, the same lines of the original theoretical

93

considerations that led to this present study).

All three

groups could be matched on the total IQ scores
of the respective native IQ tests, rather than matching them
on performance
IQ,

If I embrace the new interpretation offered in
this

discussion or if

I

had substantiated my original hypotheses,

some far-reaching implications should be clear:
to be the crux of thinking.

imagery seems

Consequently, it may be sound

educational practice to train and strengthen this imagery
code in any way possible, rather than to pursue the present

and past emphasis on linguistic development and on linguistic

methods of instruction.
view.

Purth (I97I) proposes an identical

Or could it be that present and future mass societies

place more survival value on an extensive communication network rather than on the individual's level of intelligence?

Along the same lines, it may be a timely observation that the
traditional verbal psycho therapies have not made a significant
impact.

If the imagery code is the backbone of cognitive

functioning, then this code may be more conducive to cognitive

and emotional change.

Consistent with this view are the en-

couraging findings of the modern 'behavior therapies', employing such techniques as covert conditioning, covert desensitization, role playing, modeling, video-tape feedback, behavior

practice and 'in vivo' desensitization.

Indeed, communication

itself may be rendered more appealing to the recipient's
imagery.

Our writing or speaking may be more effective when

9^

employing verbs rather than nouns, active clauses
rather than
passive ones, affirmative statements rather than negative
ones, and concrete descriptions rather than abstract
fabricationso

Post Hoc Analyses.
The present study found drastic overall differences

due to age.

While no official hypothesis was constructed for

this point, such an effect was certainly expected, as indica-

ted in stating the problem.

The age effect seemed to be more

pronounced for the hearing groups than for the deaf groups.
Various hypotheses could be offered as explanations for this
circumstance, such as the slight developmental increase in

linguistic competence by the deaf (Furth 1971).

We shall re-

frain from further speculations, however, in light of the pre-

viously discussed processes that may have been responsible
for showing no differences between the younger and older deaf

groups with respect to abstract words.
No overall difference was found due to deafness.

This finding is well in accord with abundant previous research.

Comparing the two older groups alone, there was a tendency of
a differerce between the deaf and the hearing in their per-

formance with abstract words.

It should be clear that any

differences between the deaf and the hearing, if they exist,

would be expected especially in regard to these stimuli.

i

95

remember the notion that the language of the deaf
is more
concrete and less abstract than the language of the

hearing.

Nevertheless, even this one difference was not significant,

and we have explored a possible reason why the older deaf
may
have performed so poorly with the abstract words.
There was a slight indication that the deaf and the

hearing behaved differently at the different age levels employed.

and

I

This was especially true in regard to abstract words,

speculated that a change in mediating processes may

occur over age.

Linguistic mediation may become more preva-

lent as the adolescent grows older s this process being more

pronounced in the hearing than in the deaf.

My original theo-

retical considerations, as well as Furth's (19?1) claim of
slower linguistic progress in the deaf, as well as a speculation offered by Lantz and Lenneberg (1966), seem to be con-

sistent with this interpretation.

We also obtained different

serial position curves for the older and younger hearing in

regard to abstract words.
Previous research has employed the Kates et al.
(1962a) method of testing three experimental groups, a deaf

group, an age-matched hearing group and a language-matched

hearing group.

Comparing these three groups in our present

experiment, our findings are consistent with established evidence.

The deaf were not inferior to their hearing age peers,

but performed significantly better than the language matched

hearing adolescents.

The difference between the deaf and the

•

o
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younger hearing was especially evident with respect to colors.
This is exactly what we would expect according to my hypothesis that imagery is the backbone of cognitive activity, and

that intellectual differences or intellectual growth should
be most clearly reflected in this imagery code*

The perfor-

mance of the older deaf with abstract words fell between that
of the younger language matches and that of the age matches*

Apart from my speculation regarding this performance, it is
consistent with the notion that the deaf's possible linguistic retardation falls along normal developmental lines (Kates
et al* 1962a)

Error Analysis
The findings that incorrect choices tend to be

from the neighborhood of the correct stimulus more often than

predicted by chance and that second guesses following an
error tend to be correct more often than predicted by chance
(Atkinson et al. 1964, Hansen I965) was interpreted by Calfee (I969) to indicate that recognition memory may not be an

all-or-none affair.

Our present error curves are consistent

with this view.
The analysis of specific errors can be a valuable

source of information if agreed-upon error categories can be

designed prior to the experiment (Conrad 1970).

This has not

been done in the present case and our interpretation of the

97

meaning of certain errors must be regarded as
highly speculative. We could make a case for claiming that

imagery med-

iation did cocur, as posulated, during the performance
with
colors.

The frequent gray-white errors, in particular,
can

not be attributed to any other than imagery confusion.
Black and brown, too, are highly conf usable on grounds
of
imagery, although verbal mediation underlying this error can

not be ruled out with certainty.

It could be claimed that

the significantly frequent red-green errors were due to the

fact that these were the two most striking colors among the
stimuli, which is also supported by the high accuracy of rec-

ognition for these two colors.

The pronounced recency effect

with colors, as discussed below, can also be seen as pointing
to imagery mediation.

With respect to color-words, no spectacular infer-

ences can be made.

Articulatory coding, which would be expec-

ted here, should have led to BLACK- BLUE errors and to GRAY-

GREEN errors.

Instead, we found again highly- frequent BLACK-

BROWN errors and RED-GREEN errors.

Mediation of meaning in regard to abstract words
can be ruled out because of the few TRUTH-FACT errors.

MIND-

TIME errors, which were significant for the younger hearing
group, could be pointing to acoustic-verbal as well as to

visual coding.

It could be argued that TRUTH and TIME may be

confused on visual grounds.

This error barely missed signi-

ficance of occurrence for the deaf collectively and for the
i

»
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younger deaf in particular.

Thus, these errors are at least

not inconsistent with our previous speculation of imagery

mediation playing a role here.

Analysis of Accuracy.
Some points coming out of this analysis were

already mentioned elsewhere in the discussion.

Some meaning

may be derived from inspecting the primacy and recency effects
of the memory curves.

It may be argued that a primacy effect

could signify verbal rehearsal or the retention of a verbal
list of stimuli.

Recency, on the other hand, may possibly

point to visual or acoustic imagery.

We should keep in mind

here that a delay condition, as employed in the present study,

usually depresses the acoustic recency effect.
Comparing memory for colors with memory for color-

words for all groups, we find a pronounced recency effect in

regard to colors.

This may add fuel to our suspicion that

imagery was, indeed, an effective mediator with these stimuli.

The observation that the younger hearing group showed

recency but no primacy in their performance with abstract
words, while the older hearing showed the reverse, may be
seen as peripheral support for the nction that different med

iating processes may have been active here.
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SUMMARY.

The purpose of the present study was to investi-

gate the cognitive codes that are used in the process of
thinking.

Several possible coding systems were postulated,

with focus on language and imagery.

While language is cer-

tainly useful in many respects, it is not believed to be

necessary for thinking to occur.

It was postulated that

imagery carried the prime responsibility for cognitive processes.

The relationship between imagery and language was

hypothesized to be a complementary one, meaning that linguistic deficiency or linguistic inferiority may lead to

greater use of imagery and consequently greater facility
with imagery.

Specific predictions were made regarding the

absolute as well as the relative facility with language and

imagery in deaf and hearing adolescents.
A new design of four experimental groups was em-

ployed, yielding two levels of inquiry for the independent

variables of age and deafness.
levels, eleven

and.

Deaf adolescents at two age

sixteen years old, were matched with hear-

ing adolescents on age, IQ, sex and socioeconomic background.
In addition the older deaf were matched with the younger

hearing on written language comprehension.
tained 17 children.

Each group con-

The stimuli consisted of colors, concrete

words and abstract words.

Subjects were shown a series of

stimuli and were asked to record the serial position of a

t

100

subsequently exposed memory probe.
The hypotheses were not supported.

Findings were

in general non- significant, apart frcm a strong
effect due
to age.

Possibilities of procedural shortcoming were dis-

cussed; although they could not be rejected definitively,

they were not favored in most cases.

The complicating poss-

ibility that other-than-linguistic coding may have been em-

ployed in dealing with the abstract words, at least with
regard to the younger deaf children, found indications of
support.

A plausible and tentatively preferred explanation

for the non- significant findings could be that there are,
indeed, no differences between the deaf and the hearing.

Imagery and language may not be complementary coding systems,
but it may be the case that the facility with imagery is

determined by maturation and experience.

The level of imag-

ery capacity, in turn, may determine or possibly even consti-

tute the level of intellective functioning, regardless of

linguistic skills.

Future research possibilities were dis-

cussed, and far-reaching implications for education, therapy

and communication were speculated.

—

i

>
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APPENDIX A

Dear Parents and Students,

This study is part of a continuing research program involving the
Clarke School for the Deaf and various Northampton public schools. Deaf
and hearing adolescents are compared, in order to learn more about deafness,
as well as to improve elementary and secondary education.

We need a group of normal hearing students who are exactly equal in
age to our deaf students. Our two tests take about 30 minutes each; most
students have found them enjoyable. These tests are not school tests, and
the results do not become part of the school records.

Your participation on this project will be of great value to our
research.

Thank you.
Toni Farrenkopf
Research Associate

Ill
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APPENDIX C
Pilot Work.
The procedure, as described in Chapter II,
has been

derived from extensive pilot work with deaf and hearing
adolescents, as well as some testing with college adults.

First,

a paired associate task, using six colors or six color-words
as cues and using a spoken number from one to six as response,

had been employed with four college adults.

Trial- to- criter-

ion scores as well as error scores were much lower in the

color condition than in the color- word condition; these scores

indicating the predicted trend.

A similar paired associate

task has been employed with two deaf and eight hearing ado«

lescents between the ages of 9 and 13 years.

Instead of re-

sponding orally to a given stimulus, the subjects were required
to point to one of six circles drawn on a sheet of paper.

The

circles were to be replaced by response buttons in the actual

experimental procedure.

Apart from some error- free and gen-

erally low-error learning, subjects were found to pay more

attention to the response aspects than to the stimulus aspects
of this learning task.

Since most of the learning occurred

at the response level, no trend emerged due to stimulus differences.

The paired associate task was modified in order to

diminish response learning.
a second stimulus (response).

A stimulus (cue) was followed by

Subjects had to learn and pre-
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diet the second member of each stimulus pair,
indicating

their choice again by pointing to a circle in front
of them.
These circles had colors on them in the case of the stimuli
being colors and color- words in the verbal condition.

There

was still believed to be some qualitative difference between
the responses in these two conditions, so that the importance

of response learning could not be ruled out.

More important,

the trial- to-criteri on scores for six pairs of stimuli were

again quite low and not suitable for meaningful comparisons.
This does not rule out that an appropriate paired associate

task could have been constructed for the purposes of this
study.

However,, the paired associate procedure has been

rejected in favor of a card-recognition technique, described
by Calfee (1969).
This card-guessing technique has been used in a

variety of studies on subjects ranging from nursery school
children to college students (Atkinson, Hansen and Bernbach
1964, Hansen I965, Bernbach 19 6?, Atkinson and Shiffrin 1968,

Calfee 1969).

In the usual procedure the subject is presented

with a series of stimulus cards, which are placed face down
after exposure.

Then a probe is presented and the subject

has to indicate the corresponding stimulus card.

The great

advantage of this basic procedure lies in the circumstance
that there is no limit to the number of possible trials per
subject.

This procedure also allows unlimited within-subject

variation since there is no contamination from previous learn-
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ing on any trial.

Eight hearing and two deaf adolescents have under-

gone several variations of this procedure.

The deaf, who

performed rather poorly, were considered not typical of the

planned deaf subject groups and they are not included in the
following considerations.

Over-all recognition scores for

colors were higher (18/20 or 90$) than for color words
(10/12 or 83$), again indicating the predicted trend.

When

separated into two age groups, the older children, 12 to 13
years, evidenced 100$ accuracy in both conditions, compared
to 77% accuracy in both conditions for the younger group, 9

to 10| years.

It was undesirable to have such high recogni-

tion scores, since this would allow little room for variation

and for meaningful comparisons.

A modified procedure, based on the one used by
Hansen (I965) has been employed with these adolescents, in

order to suppress the high recognition scores.

In Hansen's

procedure one array of stimulus cards is placed face down
after exposure.

Then a second array of identical cards is

presented and placed face up in front of the subject.

Then

the experimenter points to one of the stimuli in the face-up

array, and the subject has to indicate the matching card in
the face-down array.

This procedure introduces a delay

between the presentation of the last memory stimulus and the
actual test, and the proportion of correct responses has been

found to be lower than in the single-array procedure.

115

Performance of the pilot subjects was indeed suppressed, with the older children scoring 11/13 or 85$ with
the colors as well as with the color- words, and the younger

children scoring 6/8 or 75$ with colors and 5/10 or 50% with
color- words.

Although these scores were much too few to

warrant confident statements, it can be seen a. that the

younger experienced a drastic drop from colors to color-words
(75$ to 50$)

5

whereas the older showed no such drop, and b.

that the younger showed less relative loss in the color con-

dition than the older, when going from the one-array no-delay

procedure to the two-array delay procedure (77$ to 75$ and

100$ to 85$ respectively).

Both these possible trends were

consistent with my theoretical predictions.

Although the Hansen (I965) procedure yielded roughly
suitable performance scores, it was noted that another variable

may have been introduced here*

Since the second array of stim-

uli is largely irrelevant to the task until one of its cards

has been selected as probe, some children adopted the tactic

of not paying attention during the presentation of this second
array and verbally rehearsing the order of the face-down array
instead.

Another procedure had to be found which either em-

ployed a delay without allowing rehearsal, or otherwise was
capable of lowering the scores.
A procedure in which only a single array of cards

was presented, but where the cards

x-rere

placed on the table in

adolescents, 11
a mixed-up order, was tried with four hearing

to 14 years old.

As before, six stimuli were used*

scores emerged, typically 3/5, 3/6 or

V6,

Suitable

but the great

emphasis on ability of spatial coding may have introduced
un desired confounding factors.

Another method has also been rejected, namely
retaining the two-array procedure, but preventing rehearsal
by making the subjects overtly label or read each stimulus,

including the entire second row, upon presentation.

While

it has been typically found that overt verbalizing increases

recognition in the one-array procedure (Calfee I969),

I

would

expect that the naming of the stimuli in the irrelevant sec-

ond row interferes with the task at hand.

My pilot work in-

cluded this condition, and deterioration of performance was

indeed the outcome.

Thus, overt verbalization would intro-

duce both beneficial as well as deleterious effects within
the same procedure, and it would be difficult to predict or

justify the outcome.

Differential effects due to overt la-

beling of stimuli was also shown by Conrad (1970).

He was

able to divide his deaf subjects into 'articulators* and

•non-articulators 9

.

The former group benefitted from overt

labeling of stimuli, whereas the latter group suffered from
it.

A one-array procedure that successfully reduced

recognition scores was designed.

First, the stimulus list

was lengthened by one (the color gray), and the presentation
rate shortened from about two seconds to one second.

Both

11?

these methods have been reported to reduce recognition
scores
(Hansen 1965, Calfee I969).

Three subjects, ages 12, 13 and

Ik years scjred 15/18 or 8*$ and one 9-year old scored
3/6
or 50% across the two stimulus conditions. As an additional
technique to reduce scores, varying delays were employed without, however, allowing rehearsal.

After presentation of the

last memory stimulus, the experimenter named a number, and
the child counted out loud starting from the given number.

After either five or ten seconds the counting was stopped and
the memory probe was presented.

The five-second delay proce-

dure reduced the scores considerably? the three older children scoring 9/18 or 50$, and the 9-year old (as well as the

12-year old whom
or 33$.

I

included in the older group) scoring 2/6

The ten-second delay procedure reduced the older

group's score to 4/18 and was deemed inappropriate for our
purposes.

In any case,

the employed delay technique seemed

sensitive enough to either improve or reduce the recognition
scores at the discretion of the experimenter.
Finally, the procedure described above in detail

was adopted.

The subject groups that were to be employed in

the experiment were matched by this time, and the experimen-

ter had purposefully matched a few extra subjects of the

younger deaf group and the older hearing group.

These extra

subjects were not part of the actual experimental groups,
but they constituted representative specimens of these groups.
This way, the final pilot work could be conducted with sub-
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jects who were equivalent to the experimental population at

least in respeot to the most important characteristics, such
as age, IQ and socioeconomic background;

The experimenter

had three main questions for this final pilot works

one,

was a delay procedure necessary at all or would the better
subjects, the older hearing, perform too well without such
delay?

Two, if a delay condition was indicated, how long

should this delay be?

And three, how long would it take the

slowest group, the younger deaf, to go through the complete

experimental procedure with ten trials for each of the three
stimulus conditions?

Furthermore, this pre-experimental test-

ing gave the experimenter and his assistant the necessary

practice with the experimental procedure*
Three hearing adolescents and five deaf children

were tested in small groups, employing various stimulus conditions and a no-delay as well as a 5~ seconds-delay procedure.
When the children were not required to count between presen-

tation of the last memory stimulus and the memory probe, the

older hearing evidenced 25/ 30 or 83$ accuracy of recognition

and the younger deaf scored 31/80 or

Overall 9 recogni-

tion was better for colors than for the words.

Employing the

5-seconds delay procedure, recognition was reduced to 10/30
or 33^ and 25/90 or 28$ for the older hearing and the younger
deaf respectively.

It was decided, that some delay was desi-

rable, but that 5 seconds of delay rendered the task some-

what too difficult.

The delay to be used in the experiment
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proper was set at 3 seconds.

(The recognition scores in the

actual experiment ranged from 2%% to 53%).

It was also found

that the younger deaf required about k5 minutes to
complete
the experiment.

This time was believed to be highly undesi-

rable 5 since all subjects, especially the deaf, showed signs
of restlessness after about 30 minutes.

Both the subjects as

well as the experimenter became restless after about seven
trials of the same stimulus condition.

For these reasons,

the number of trials per stimulus condition were reduced from
ten to eight for the experiment.

i

APPENDIX

D

TABLE Dl

EXPERIMENTAL RAW SCORES OF THE YOUNGER DEAF SUBJECTS.

Subject

Colors

Color- Words
—

~-

...... n

Abstract
.

..

1

4

6

2

2

3
2

1
1

7

3

5
6
7

8
9

10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1?

k

7
2

3
3
1
1

3
.5
•3

5
2
5
2
2

3

2
•

1
3

2
1
2
2
2
2

3
3
5
1
1

3
3
2
2
1

k
1
5
3

:
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TABLE D2.

EXPERIMENTAL RAW SCORES OF THE YOUNGER HEARING SUBJECTS.

Subject
T

Colors

8

19
?0
21

22
23

25
26
27
28
29
30

1
j
2
0
1
2

Co lor- Words
o
c
o

i

3
6

3
5

1
6
3

1

3
1

2

32
33
3^

3
3
2

1
2
2

Abstrac
o
c
"5

J>

J
2
0
0

3
2
1
3
1
2
2

3
3
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TABLE D3.

EXPERIMENTAL RAW SCORES OF THE OLDER DEAF SUBJECTS.

Subject

Colors

Color- Words

35
36
37

0

6

J J

I.

38
39
4o

I,

42
^3

44
45
46
4?
48
49
50
51

3

2

4
4
3

2
2
2

4

1

2

4

4

2
6

5
5
2
5
5
6

Abstract 'Words

3
2

1
6

3
2

4

4

2
6

2

4

6
2

3
3

2

4

4

3

2

3

3

TABLE D4.

EXPERIMENTAL RAW SCORES OF THE OLDER HEARING SUBJECTS.

Subject

Colors

Color- Words

IW M iiU MM kHnMiAn^MMNMMMMMMM M — IWn
I

i.i.jii

i

.-w-

«

Abstract Words

.

52
53

5

5^

5
3

3

5

4

2

5
3

4

4

^

4

2
2

o

4

55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
6?
68

7

6

4
4

5
3
5

4-1

3

5

4
5

4

5
3

2

2

6

4

4

5
2

5
5
6
3

5
5

4
6

2

4
3
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APPENDIX E
TABLE El.
SPECIFIC ERRORS MADE IN COLOR RECOGNITION BY THE FOUR

EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS a .
Error pairs

Younger
deaf

blue- black
blue- brown
blue-red
blue-green
blue-White
blue-gray
black- brown
black-red
black-green
black-gray
black-white
brown-red
brown-green
brown-gray
brown-whi te
red-green
red-gray
red-whi te
green-gray
green-white
gray- white

4 (8)
4 (10)
(4)
4 (9)
1 (l)
3

Younger
hearing

3

(4)

7

(11)
(7)
(9)

4 (10)

11

(

3^)^*

(6)

1 (20)
1

(1)

4 (12)
7 (11)

9
6
2
2
5

Older
deaf

Older
hearing

1
3
2
2
5
1

2

(19)*

3

(10)

4

(8)
(2)
(9)
(8)

3
2

4

(2)
(3)
(2)
(3)
(5)
(1)
(3)
(6)
(6)
(5)
(5)

(3)

4 (6)
6 (13)*
3.

3

(1)
(3)
mm

4 (6)
6 (8)*
2

(5)

2

(6)
(8)
(7)
(6)
(3)

4

10 (20)*
(17)

5 (10)
4 (14)
5 (7)
3 (3)
8 (13)***
3 (9)
4 (10)
4 (11)
1 (1)
5 (15)

2. 33

2.12

1. 96

2.06

4
2.81

4. 48

3.43
1. 65

3
1 .7

2

(6)

7
8
1

(11)
(18)

3
2

(5)
(7)

7

(19)

w

4 (14)
6 (20)
2
6

(3)

(U)
(8)

6
6

(10)
(10)

3

4
3

4 (14)
1 (1)
3 (6)
3 (8)
2 (8)
6 (18)*

avg. # pos.

per errorb
M

SD

2.49

a - the figures in parentheses give the total number of positions that the specific error was removed from the
correct answer.
b - the average number of positions that the specific group's
errors were removed from the correct answer.
* - .05 level of significance
** - .025 level of significance
*** - .01 level of significance
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TABLE E2.
SPECIFIC ERRORS MADE IN THE RECOGNITION OF COLOR- WORDS BY
THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS.

Error pairs

BLUE- BLACK
BLUE- BROWN
BLUE- RED
BLUE- GREEN

BLUE-GRAY
BLUE- WHITE

Younger
deaf

Younger
hearing

Older
deaf

Olde

4 (10)

4

D
O

4 (4)
1 (1)
4 (7)

r

r

(

<\

(q)

(

J<

7f

(

4

JL

(1

r

JL

4 (7)

MR} *

BLA Civ- BRO UN
BLACK- RED
BLACK- GREEN
BLACK- GRAY
BLACK- WHITE
BROWN- RED
BROWN -GREEN
BROWN -GRAY
BROWN- WHITE
RED- GREEN

7

RED-GRAY
RED- WHITE
GREEN-GRAY
GREEN- WHITE
GRAY- WHITE

4 (7)
5 (10)

(6)
4 (3 0)
6 (8)
3 (10)
2 (3)
5 (14)
4 (8)
5 (10)
r

7

(17)*

2

(9)
5 (9)
6 (12)

3

1

^
)

1)1
J
(6)
(

\

1

^

o

/

(in

o

1

J
Q
O

(6)
5 (6)
5 (15)
5 (8)
1 (2)
3 (7)
1 (1)
2 (5)

8)*
4 (8)
3 (11)
9 (21)****
1 (2)
3 (4)
3 (5)
2 (4)
5 (8)
2 (3)
2 (5)
6 (10)
1 (2)
1
2 (II
5 (8)
3 (8)
4 (4)

1. 93
3- 52
2. ^3

1.82
3.43
2.05

7

*|

J-

2

(2)

XU

4 (8)
3
3
5
2
1

(5)
(7)

X
\

£

J

(11)

(6)
(4)
3 (5)
4 (8)
7 (14)
3 (6)
2 (6)
3 (7)
6

(14)
5 (15)

hearing

i CD
4 (6)
3

(

avg. # pos.

per error
M
SD

4.43

2.08
4. 05

1. 37

2. 32

2. 09

- .05 level of significance
* - .01 level of significance
•

.005 level of significance
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TABLE E3.

SPECIFIC ERRORS MADE IN THE RECOGNITION OF ABSTRACT WORDS
BY THE FOUR EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS.

Error pair

Younger
deaf

Younger
hearing

TRUTH- FACT
TRUTH- HOPE
TRUTH-LAW
TRUTH- CO ST
TRUTH-MIND
TRUTH-TIME
FACT-HOPE
FACT-LAW
FACT- CO ST
FACT-MIND
FACT-TIME
HOPE-LAW
HOPE-COST
HOPE-MIND

4 (6)

HOPE-TIME
LAW- COST
LAW-MIND
LAW- TIME
COST-MIND
COST-TIME
MIND- TIME

3 (11)
5 (8)
1 (1)
6 (18)

1 (1)
6 (16)
5 (13)
6 (16)
7 (19)
3
7 (18)
8 (23)
4 (8)
5 (7)
5 (10)
1 (1)
3 (5)
7 (12)
3 (7)

5
2
3
3
6
3
5

(11)

w

(7)
(6)

Ms

(19)
(7)

(10)
2 (7)
4 (15)
(9)
3 (6)
3 (5)
8 (10)**

7

(16)*

5 (14)
2 (2)

•

Older
deaf

Older
hearing

2 (4)
9 (20)**
4 (7)
4 (8)

4 (5)
4 (11)
3

(4)
(6)

7 (17)
6 (16)
1 (1)

6

(15)

7
3

(11)

5
5
3
6
5
3
1

(15)
(12)

(4)

(8)

(15)
(11)
(8)
(1)

3 (7)
5 (7)
(9)
6 (14)
9 (19)*

6"

2.21
4.67

2.18
4.19

2. 32

2. 22

(15)
2 (5)
5 (10)
4 (4)

3

1 (2)
5 (13)
2
2
3
2

(2)
(6)
(9)
(3)
1 (6)
4 (4)
3 (11)
2 (4)
4 (5)
4 (8)

4 (11)
8 (13)***
6

1

(9)
(1)

avg. # pos.

2o28

per error
M
SD
—mum muw

1.74
1

urn

1

11

1

in

m wmi

iww.i w<fti whiihitiuti f
i

i

-

——— —
1

-

* - .05 level of significance.
** - .025 level of significance.
*** - .01 level of significance.

1

2. 05

3.43
1.76
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APPENDIX F.
TABLE Fc

ACCURACY OF RECOGNITION OF INDICIDUAL COLORS (a.), INDIVID

UAL COLOR- WORDS

AND INDIVIDUAL ABSTRACT WORDS BY THE

(b«>)

FOUR EXPERIMENTAL GROUPS a .
Stimulus

Red
Green
Gray
Brown
White
Blue
Black

a.

Younger
deaf
65
29

35
30

RED
GREEN
GRAY
BROWN
WHITE
BLUE
BLACK
Stimulus

TRUTH
FACT
HOPE
COST
LAW
MIND
TIME
a - in percent

4o
35
50

Older
deaf

^5

Younger
deaf

Younger

Marine

41
35

35
47

Younger
hearing

30
29

47
39
25

74
43

Older
deaf
45

Younger
deaf
35
53

55
53
60

20
25
55
12

24

hear^nj;

50
39
52

30
46
29
30
30
40
47

35
27

Older

53

35
22
18
12

^3
35
18

Stimulus

b.

Younger
hearing

46
35
40
60
50

Older
hearin
65
42
41
60

45
41

29

40

24
26
35
29

13
30

Older
deaf
20
41
39

53
35
26
35

Older
hearing.
50

71
43
12
65
30
55
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APPENDIX G
TABLE G.
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR ALL INDEPENDENT AND DEPENDENT

VARIABLES EMPLOYED IN THE EXPERIMENT.
vaxiaDies

lounger
deal

.,...„

Younger
hearing

Older
deaf

Older
hearing

-.38

-.49*

-.11
• 03

I..,,,,.

Age-IQ
Age-SEa

-.13
-.29

.16
.11

.03

-.17

-.00

.29
.02

.45
.06

.19
.40

.04

-.45

-.21
-.05

-.11

-.19

.47

.10

IQ-C
IQ-CW

;02
.15

.20
•39

.48

-.03

10- AW

-;24

il5
.04
.34

-.11

•35

SE-C
SE-CW
SE-AW

•15

.14
-.27

-.62**

-.17

.12
.27

•37

-.07

-.23

-.23

-.13

-.06
-.12

Age»LAt)

-•04
Ji

IQ-LA
SE-LA

_

Age-C c
Age-CW d
Age-AWe

LA-C
LA-CW
LA- AW

•

30

•

51*

.45
•13

.07

•

-.28
n

.16

2.1

a - Socioeconomic background,
b - Language achievement.
c - Recognition performance with color stimuli.
d - Recognition performance with color-word stimuli.
e - Recognition performance with abstract viord stimuli.
* - .05 significance level
** - .02 significance level

1
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APPENDIX H

Rcscnrch Department

Unxy

Heredity of Deafness

Ruth

B.

Hudgins, Ed.M.

©cljonl for

U]j?

Scaf

Sfnrtljtuujjlun, £HasBacljitsetlfi

L.

George

T.

F^att

Assistant to the Principal

Bill G. Blevins

Psychology

Sous

Principal

01060

Kates, Ph.D.

Business Manager and Treasurer

Edwin

Telephone: 584-3450

Audiology

Arthur Boothroyd, Ph.D.

June 2, 1971

Dear
I would like to express

my gratitude for your generous help

in accomplishing the present stage of

ray

research efforts*

—

guidance counselors, teachers,
A large number of persons
administrators and researchers, as veil as the many eager and
participated in this project.
charming youngsters

—

Let us hope that all our efforts will be rewarded by some
meaningful findings vhich vill point the way to a significant
research contribution.

Sincerely,

Toni Farrcnkopf
Research Associate

B.

Hubbard,

Jk.

